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ABSTRACT. 
Computer system security violations and misuses are 
inherent part of the increasing evolution and utilization 
of the information technology. Trusted computer 
evaluation criteria define manners to counter and limit 
these threats to the good functioning of a computer 
system environment, threats that can sometimes have 
considerable consequences. One possible counter-measure, 
proposed in this document, is to log the activities of 
the users on a sys tern and produce security audit trails 
that permit after-the-fact analysis of these activities 
to detect possible security breaches going from 
manipulation errors to voluntary attacks. 
These security audit trails may be analysed by two types 
of evaluators : reduction tools that are passive means of 
analysis and automatic analysis tools that use artificial 
intelligence techniques to make the evaluation more 
active or "intelligent", and in some case to react in 
real-time against the discovered attack. 
Des mauvaises utilisations et des violations de securite 
de systemes d'ordinateurs sont des consequences 
inherentes a la croissance de l 'evolution et de 
!'utilisation de l'informatique. Des criteres 
d'evaluation de "systemes informatiques stirs" definissent 
des moyens afin de contrer et de limiter ces menaces au 
bon fonctionnement des systemes, menaces qui parfois ont 
des consequences considerables. Une contre-mesure 
envisageable proposee dans ce document est d'enregistrer 
l'activite des utilisateurs d'un systeme et ainsi de 
produire des "audit trails" concernant la securi te qui 
permettront une analyse posterieure de cette activite 
afin de decouvrir d'eventuelles violations allant des 
erreurs de manipulation aux attaques volontaires. 
Ces audit trails concernant la securi te peuvent, selon 
les cas, etre analyses par deux types d'evaluateurs les 
outils reducteurs qui analysent de maniere passive et les 
outils d'analyses automatiques qui utilisent des 
techniques d'intelligence artificielle pour faire une 
evaluation plus active ou "intelligen te", et dans 
certains cas pour reagir en temps reel a 1 'attaque en 
question. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
This document has the objective to explain to the reader 
that an "intelligent" help can be provided to the 
security officers who have the task to evaluate very 
large amounts of data contained in security audit trail. 
The term "in tel 1 igen t" has the same meaning, the same 
advantages and restrictions than those of the artificial 
intelligence field, artificial intelligence that will be 
used to develop techniques of audit trail evaluation and 
analysis. 
To achieve this purpose, chapter 1 first presents 
security breaches that may occur in any computer system, 
and insists on the particular security violations that 
are computer break-ins. Chapter 1 then proposes and 
presents some trusted computer evaluation criteria books 
that try to define and provide counter-measures to limit 
these security threats. 
Chapter 2 describes theoretically and through several 
examples one particular manner to counter security 
breaches and attacks, that is the generation of security 
audit trail. 
These audit trails have to be analysed or evaluated. 
Chapter 3 exposes a passive way of analysis and the kind 
of malicious activities that can be detected by reduction 
tools. Examples of these reductions tools are presented. 
Trying to resolve the disadvantages of these passive 
tools, chapter 4 develops "intelligent" methods - used by 
automatic analysis tools - such as behaviour pattern 
recognition, statistical components and methods learning 
system behaviours, that make feasible active evaluations 
of security audit trails. Some already-existing tools and 
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prototypes 
artificial 
are detailed. 
intelligence 
In parallel, methods 
techniques (knowledge 
using 
base, 
expert systems, learning methods) are developed. 
Chapter 5 is the concrete part of this document, 
commenting the elaboration of a "learning normal system 
behaviour" component realized during the period of 
training in SIEMENS-NIXDORF INFORMATIONSSYSTEM (in Namur) 
and in SIEMENS AG ( in Munich) . This prototype analyses 
security audit trails based on the expected behaviours of 
the users. 
In chapter 6, a look at the future evolutions of these 
automatic analysis tools is envisaged through a series of 
criteria, and particularly through the evolution of the 
artificial intelligence field. One example of this 
evolution is illustrated by the use of neural networks to 
evaluate security audit trails. 
In several chapter of this thesis some audit mechanisms 
and tools are described and compared. They are considered 
at the end of the year 1990, and some evolutions may be 
brought to them since this period. 
In the following text, 
reference to the glossary. 
present in the glossary but 
to the present particular 
therefore have an unknown, 
meaning for the reader. 
all underlined terms make 
They are not the only ones 
are supposed to be relative 
subject of study and could 
imprecise or even different 
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SECURITY THREATS AND COUNTERMEASURES. 
As computer science 
becomes more and more 
and storage powers of 
rapidly evolves, its utilization 
frequent and common. The computing 
Information Technologies (IT) are 
unceasingly a challenge. The information is computed more 
and more quickly and stored on smaller and smaller data 
supports. The information is also more and more 
(logically) centralized. Another facet of IT is the great 
dependence on the information that computer users 
(individuals, organizations, societies, ... ) want to 
"automatically" process. 
The increasing progresses of the technology and the 
dependence on the information must put in everyone's mind 
that security in IT is certainly not to be neglected. 
Natural catastrophes, accidental circumstances, 
breakdowns, errors of manipulation, misusing, thefts, 
are threats that may destroy computer systems, the 
information processed and all the organization which 
depends directly or not on them, if this one has 
neglected some elementary security measures. 
A threat is a function of the operational environment of 
the system and the sensitivity of the data being 
processed in the system. The basic threats to which a 
computer system is exposed are : 
- loss of confidentiality means that some 
unauthorized accesses to information may occur 
and that information is not only disclosed to 
those users who are authorised to have access to 
it; 
- loss of integrity: means that some 
modifications of information may be 
and that information is not only 
those users who have right to do so; 
unauthorized 
perpetrated, 
modified by 
3 
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- loss of availability means that some 
functionality are 
and resources can 
unauthorized weakening of 
possible, and that information 
not sometimes be accessed by 
when needed. 
authorized users 
A lot of computer security measures 
counter the great number of various 
security is a very large field that 
groups of safeguards : 
are elaborated to 
threats. Computer 
consists of three 
1) the physical security to protect and control the 
access to the computer environment including : 
- geographical situation free from 
sources of natural disasters (flooding, 
fire, ... ), 
- building architecture, 
- air-conditioning equipment, 
- data communication, 
2) the operational and procedural security that is 
concerned with putting constraints on employees 
in data processing organizations : 
- separation of responsibility of people 
in sensitive jobs, 
- limitation of the access to only 
concerned, trusted personal members, 
- restricted access to data supports and 
devices, 
- remote storage of back-up supplies and 
copies of important data files and 
programs, 
4 
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3) the internal computer security that uses control 
and protection mechanisms within the hardware, 
software, and data communication circuits of the 
computer system : 
- identification and authentication of 
the users, 
- access control mechanisms to protect 
files, programs, 
- cryptography capabilities, 
- monitoring and auditing, 
- restart and recovery capabilities, 
These safeguards are needed for 
prevention, detection and recovery. 
the deterrence, 
There 
that 
fully 
are so many parameters concerning computer security 
a great problem is the impossibility to reach a 
secure environment. 
In this document, our attention will be focused on 
particular threats that are security violations. The 
following section (1. 1) will introduce some different 
kinds of breaches to familiarize the reader with the 
various measures that exist to counter malicious actions. 
Security evaluation criteria are presented as 
countermeasures in section 1.2 of this chapter. 
1.1. Security Break-ins. 
As the information - sometimes of high interest and 
importance - is stored in smaller centralized areas, it 
could be attractive for malicious people to try to get or 
destroy information, just only by game or for malicious 
uses. Another type of misuses may be accidental. A system 
flaw may give unexpected access to a well meaning user. 
Typing errors could produce unintentional malicious 
result. A new user may even be unaware of certain aspects 
of the system policy. But we make no attempt to divine 
intent or malevolence. 
5 
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Without going into details, several kinds of attacks can 
be distinguished and various malicious people may be 
involved in security breaches as described in the two 
next sections. 
1.1.1. Kinds of attacks. 
Four kinds of misuses to the security of a computing 
system can be distinguished interruption, interception, 
modification, and fabrication as shown in figure 1.1. 
l111terrupti111 h1terceptioa 
::r 
ftodification fabrication 
Figure 1.1 Four classes of System Security Failures. 
a) In an interruption, an asset of the system becomes 
lost or unavailable or unusable. Examples are 
malicious destruction of a hardware device, erasure of 
a program, leakage of classified data, destruction of 
accounts, or failure of an operating system file 
manager so that it cannot find a particular disk 
file, 
b) An interception means that some unauthorized party has 
access to an asset. The outside party can be a person, 
a program, or a computing system. While a loss may be 
discovered fairly quickly, a silent interceptor may 
leave no traces by which the interception can be 
readily detected. Interceptions may be perpetrated by 
"tourists" who trespass the system and break as 
hobby, or by people looking at the system, browsing 
passively or actively (scavenging with goal in mind), 
collecting information by aggregation (accumulation of 
Chapter 1 Security Threats and Countermeasures 
information) or by inference (distillation of 
information). Examples of this type of failure are 
illicit copying of general softwares or specific 
sensitive data files, or wiretapping to obtain data in 
a network. 
c) If an unauthorized party not only accesses but tampers 
with an asset, the failure becomes a modification. 
Modification may be performed on data (data diddling 
or false data entry) , on programs ( time bombs1, logic 
bombs 2,Trojan horses 3, viruses4), or on system 
behaviours (access rights, password files, accounting, 
ownership). It is even possible for hardware to be 
modified. For examples, someone might modify the 
values in a data base, alter a program so that it 
performs an additional computation, or modify data 
being transmitted. 
d) Finally, an unauthorized party might fabricate 
counterfeit objects for a computing system. The 
intruder may wish to add spurious transactions to a 
network communication system, or add records to an 
existing data base. 
1.1.2. The involved people. 
People may pose a threat because of accidental acts and 
deliberate acts. "The possibility of inadvertent mistakes 
by people is fully recognised by designers but the 
dangers from malicious and deliberate acts receive less 
attention, except by designers of highly sensitive 
systems" [Lane 85]. "Deliberate threats can be subdivided 
into three areas : 
a) threats that do not require the subverter to be a 
user of the system, such as physical threats and 
data communication line threats; 
1 A time bomb is a program activated by the computer's clock to initiate a fraud, disruption or 
other "perverse activity", 
2 A logic bomb is similar to a time bomb but is stirred into action by a combination of events 
rather than time. 
3 Troyan Horses are illicit parts of innocent programs with effects similar to bombs but not 
activated by a specified set of circumstance. 
4 Viruses reproduce themselves within a disc and move from one system to another, but have a 
variety of ultimate effects. 
7 
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b) threats that may allow the subverter to become an 
illegal user, in particular, threats to obtain 
user codes and passwords; 
c) and threats that require the infiltrator to be a 
user, whether he is legitimate or not." 
[Walker 77] 
In the following of this document, we will not pay 
attention to physical threats that are physical manners 
to destroy or get information (such as to steal magnetic 
tapes, ... ), and/or to demolish or rob some components of 
hardware. We will rather concentrate our attention to 
other methods of attacks perpetrated on the data and 
software of a system. These attacks can be perpetrated by 
exploiting computer vulnerabilities, that are weaknesses 
in the system, to cause loss or harm. The two major kinds 
of security violations in computer systems that are 
interesting for automatic intrusion detection, are the 
external and internal intrusions of the system security. 
External intrusions are those perpetrated by people who 
are not authorized to use the computer system and who try 
to by-pass the control mechanisms to have access to the 
system and to become, once inside this system, illegal 
users acting on a legal user account. 
Internal intrusions occur when users are authorized to 
use the computer system, but not the data, programs, or 
resources, and try to get more privilege than they 
already have. They can act as clandestine users evading 
supervising mechanisms (auditing, monitoring, ... ) and 
access controls; or as masqueraders operating under other 
userid and passwords, or acting in such a way that it is 
not possible to know "who is doing what". Another kind of 
internal breaches can be perpetrated by misfeasors who 
are also authorized to use the computer system and 
resources but misuse their privileges. 
8 
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1.2. Countermeasures. 
There are many possible countermeasures imagined to fight 
computer abuses and misuses. Some of these methods are 
listed below: 
- terminal access controls, 
locks and identification 
procedures; 
passwords, terminal 
and authorisation 
- encryption that transforms or codes data so that 
it is unintelligible to the outside observer, and 
the value of an interception and the possibility 
of a modification or a fabrication are almost 
nullified; 
- threat monitoring that collects and analyses 
information on security system operations in 
real-time providing protection responses such as 
job cancellation, advising the operator, etc; 
- security audi ting5 meaning the logging of 
information about requests of protected 
resources, and the subsequent post facto analysis 
in order to detect security violations, 
- many other security methods are used such as 
back-up copies, physical access controls, 
redundancy, 
1.2.1. Presentation of trusted system criteria. 
As the security in IT is considered with more and more 
importance, several groups of work have been created 
(Department of Defence, ... ) , trying to establish rules, 
standards, norms and criteria concerning security. As 
guide-lines for security in computer systems, several 
documents describe trusted evaluation criteria that 
classify computer systems into hierarchical divisions of 
increased security protections. This section principally 
5 Security auditing will be developed in details in chapter 2 and further. 
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presents the "Department of Defense (DoD) 
Computer System Evaluation Criteria 116 [DoD 83) 
be taken as reference along this document. 
books also exist such as : 
Trusted 
that will 
But other 
"IT-Security Criteria" [ITSC 89) in Germany; 
- "Information Technology 
Criteria" [ ITS EC 90] that 
criteria of France, Germany, 
the United Kingdom; 
- "NATO Trusted Computer 
Criteria" [NTCSEC 8 5] that 
criteria of the Department 
the NATO. 
Security Evaluation 
is the harmonised 
the Netherlands and 
System Evaluation 
is the equivalent 
of Defense ones for 
These books are presented in the next section. They all 
make references to the Orange Book first published in 
1983 that is now presented. Some criteria concerning 
security audit trail and some other concepts are also 
described for a good understanding of the following 
chapters. 
The Orange Book. 
"The criteria defined in the [DoD 83] constitute a 
uniform set of basic requirements and evaluation classes 
for assessing the effectiveness of security controls 
built into Automatic Data Processing (ADP) systems". "The 
criteria were developed .with three objectives in mind : 
(a) to provide users with a yardstick with which to 
assess the degree of trust that can be placed in computer 
systems for the secure processing of classified or other 
sensitive information; (b) to provide guidance to 
manufacturers as to what to build into their new, widely-
available trusted commercial products in order to satisfy 
trust requirements for sensitive applications; and (c} to 
provide a basis for specifying security requirements in 
acquisition specifications." [DoD 83] 
6 Also known as the Oranqe Book because of the orange colour of its cover. 
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The DoD defines in the Orange Book six fundamental 
requirements derived from the "basic statement of 
objective four deal with what needs to be provided to 
control access to information; and two deal with how one 
can obtain credible assurances that this is accomplished 
in a trusted computer system." [DoD 83] 
Policy 
Requirement 1 Security Policy - There must be an 
explicit and well-defined security policy enforced by the 
system. 
Requirement 2 Marking Every object must be 
associated with a "label" that indicates the security 
level of the object. The association, which is also known 
as "marking" the object, must be done so that the label 
is available for comparison each time an access to the 
object is requested. 
Accountability 
Requirement 3 
uniquely and 
necessary so 
checked. 
- Identification - Every subject must 
convincingly identified. Identification 
that subject/object access request can 
be 
is 
be 
Requirement 4 - Accountability - The system must maintain 
complete, secure records of actions that affect security. 
Such actions include introduction of new users to the 
system, assignment or change of the security level of a 
subject or an object, and denied access attempts. 
Assurance 
Requirement 5 - Assurance - The computing system must 
contain mechanisms that enforce security, and it must be 
possible to evaluate the effectiveness of these 
mechanisms. 
Requirement 6 
that implement 
Continuous protection - The mechanisms 
security must be protected against 
unauthorized change. 
11 
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All these 
with more 
wishes to 
subdivided 
requirements have to be respected by a system 
or less severity depending on the class it 
belong. The classes are based on divisions 
themselves in categories. There are four basic 
divisions A, B, C and D, where A is the division with the 
most comprehensive degree of security. Within di visions 
there are additional distinctions, denoted with numbers, 
where the higher numbers indicate tighter security 
requirements. The complete set of classes is D, Cl, C2, 
Bl, B2, B3 and Al. The descriptions of these levels are 
listed below. Within these descriptions, text in quote 
marks is directly issued of the Orange Book [DoD 83]. 
Table 1.1 summarises the requirements of the different 
levels by indicating for each criteria (in row) whether 
there are no requirement (in column} or whether there are 
(or not) additional new requirements. 
Class D: Minimal Protection. 
Class Dis applied to systems that have been evaluated to 
verify their property to higher levels but have failed. 
No security characteristics are needed for this class. 
Class Cl : Discretionary Security Protection. 
A Trusted Computin_g Bas~ (TCB} satisfying the class Cl, 
provides an environment where users and data are 
separated. Users must be allowed to discretionarily 
protect their own data in order to limit access to other 
users or group of users (discretionary access control). A 
data owner may also decide whether and when the controls 
apply or not. This class is intended for an environment 
where cooperating users process data at the same level of 
sensitivity. 
Class C2: Controlled Access Protection. 
A class C2 system also provides discretionary access 
protection with a finer granularity of control. The 
actions of the users must be individually recognisable so 
that it is possible to know who is doing what. This can 
be realized through login procedures, audit trail 
12 
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capabilities which must be capable of tracking each 
individual's access {or attempted access) to each object, 
and resource isolation. 
Class Bl Labelled Security Protection. 
In addition to the level C2 requirements, a class Bl 
system includes mandatory {nondiscretionary) access 
control. A security level must be assigned to each 
subject, while only controlled objects must be 
individually labelled by security level ( the protection 
mechanisms do not need to control all objects at a Bl 
level). The access control decisions must be based on 
these labels to model hierarchical levels and non-
hierarchical ea tegories. Moreover an informal model of 
the security policy must be available. 
Class B2: Structured Protection. 
For a B2 level TCB, access control policies 
{discretionary and mandatory) must be enforced to all 
subjects and objects of the system, including devices. 
"The TCB must be structured into protection-critical and 
non-protection-critical elements." A formal security 
policy model must be present, and analysis of covert 
channels is required. "The system is relatively resistant 
to penetration". 
Class B3: Security Domains. 
In class B3 TCB, subject/object domains are required, 
with a capability to implement access protection for each 
object, indicating allowed subjects, kind of access 
allowed for each, and disallowed subjects. A full 
reference monitor concept must be provided, so that every 
access is checked. Requirements are also made for the 
system audit facility that must be able to identify when 
a violation of security is imminent. "The system is 
highly resistant to penetration". 
13 
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Class Al : Verified Design. 
The requirements of a class Al TCB are equivalent as the 
one at a B3 level. "The distinguishing feature of systems 
in this class is the analysis derived from formal design 
specification and verification techniques and the 
resulting high degree of assurance that the TCB is 
correctly implemented". The more important criteria of 
the class Al are ( 1} a formal model of the protection 
system and a proof of its consistency and adequacy, (2) 
formal top-level specification of the protection system, 
(3) a demonstration that the top-level specification 
corresponds to the model, (4) an implementation 
informally shown to be consistent with the specification, 
and (5) formal analysis of covert channels. 
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Table 1.1 Trusted Computer Evaluation Criteria (from the 
Orange Book [DoD 83]). 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Requirement 
Criteria D Cl C2 B1 B2 B3 Al 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Security Policy 
Discretionary Access Control II 0 0 , » 0 , 
Object Reuse II II 0 ) » ) ) 
Labels II II II 8 0 > > 
Label Integrity Ill Ill II 8 > > , 
Exportation of Labelled Information II II II 8 > ) , 
Labelling Human-Readable Output II I II 0 » » , 
Mandatory Access Control II II II 8 8 ) ) 
Subject Sensitivity Labels Ill Ill Ill Ill 8 > ) 
Device Labels II I I Ill 8 ) ) 
----------------------------------
Accountability 
Identification and Authentication II 8 8 8 ) » » 
Audit II I 8 8 8 8 ) 
Trusted Path Ill Ill II I 8 8 J, 
---------------------------------- ----------
Assurance 
System Architecture Ill 8 8 8 8 8 ) 
System Integrity I 8 > > ) , ) 
Security Testing Ill 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Design Specification and Verification Ill Ill II 8 0 8 8 
Covert Channel Analysis I II II I 8 8 8 
Trusted Facility Management Ill I Ill I 8 8 , 
Configuration Management I I II II 0 ) 8 
Trusted Recovery Ill Ill I I I 0 , 
Trusted Distribution I I I Ill I I 0 
------------ -----------
Documentation 
Security Features User's Guide I 8 , > ) ) ) 
Trusted Facility Manual I 8 8 8 0 0 , 
Test Documentation Ill 8 , > 8 > 8 
Design Documentation I 8 > 0 0 0 0 
Legend II no requirement; 
e additional requirement; 
» same requirement as previous class 
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1.2.2. What are the principal differences with the other 
security evaluation criteria books? 
The criteria proposed by the Orange Book are widely known 
and accepted as a basis for the security evaluation of 
computer systems. Some other books are now briefly 
presented to show other manners of evaluating the 
trustworthiness of IT systems. These two books are the 
"IT-Security Criteria" [ITSC 89] for Germany, and the 
"Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria" 
[ITSEC 90] that is the harmonised criteria of France, 
Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The 
[NTCSEC 85] is equivalent to the Orange Book but some 
details and then is not described here. 
The "IT-Security Criteria". 
The classes of functionality listed in the "IT-Security 
Criteria" [ITSC 89] are merely intended as guide-lines, 
to provide the users with assistance in the selection of 
a system, and the manufacturers with help in the design 
and categorisation of their systems. One system may 
conform with the requirements of several classes at the 
same time. All the classes that a system is conform with 
are listed in a certificate. These classes of 
functionality are : 
Functionality class 
respectively derived 
Fl, F2, F3, F4 and F5 that are 
from the functionality of the Orange 
Book Class Cl, 
"Functionality class 
integrity requirements 
C2, Bl, B2, and B3/Al. 
F6 is 
for 
requirements are significant, 
for 
data 
e.g. 
systems with high 
and programs. Such 
for database systems. 
Functionality class F7 sets high requirements for the 
availability of a complete system or special functions of 
a system. Such requirements are significant for process 
control systems for example. 
Functionality class F8 sets high requirements with regard 
to the safeguarding of data integrity during data 
communication. 
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Functionality class F9 is intended for systems with high 
demands on the confidentiality of data during data 
communication. An example candidate for this class is a 
cryptographic device. 
Functionality class FlO is intended for networks with 
high demands on the confidentiality and integrity of the 
communicated. For example, this can be 
sensitive information has to be 
information to be 
the case when 
communicated via 
networks." [ ITSC 8 9 J 
insecure (for example public) 
In addition of these functionality classes, assurance 
criteria and assurance levels are defined to be able to 
assess the assurance of the security functions of a 
system or a single component. As examples, some assurance 
criteria are : quality of the security policy, quality of 
the software development process, quality of the user 
related documentation, 
Eight assurance levels are defined for the rating of the 
assurance. These assurance levels are : 
QO inadequate assurance, 
Ql tested, 
Q2 methodically tested, 
Q3 methodically tested and partially analyzed, 
Q4 informally analyzed, 
Q5 semi-formally analyzed, 
Q6 formally analyzed, 
Q7 formally verified. 
Higher assurance levels than Q7 are conceivable, but 
cannot be achieved with today's technology. Such higher 
levels should be - if the coming technology permits - the 
use of formally verified tools (compilers, linkers, etc.) 
and a formally verified hardware and firmware design. 
17 
Chapter 1 Security Threats and Countermeasures 
The "Information Technology Security Evaluation 
Criteria". 
The criteria of the ''Information Technology Security 
Evaluation Criteria" [ITSEC 90] permit specification of 
arbitrary security functionality, and define seven 
evaluation levels representing increasing confidence in 
the correctness of a Target of Evaluation (TOE). "Once 
the TOE has been assessed for correctness in accordance 
with the correctness criteria for the target evaluation 
level, its effectiveness in meeting its security target 
is considered, at a level of rigour appropriate for that 
evaluation level. Thus these criteria can be applied to 
cover a wider range of possible systems and products than 
the [DoD 83]." [ITSEC 90] 
a) The functionality of a TOE consists of its security 
functions taken as a whole. Ten functionality classes (Fl 
to Fl0) have been defined as part of the [ITSEC 90]. 
These functionality are identical to those of the 
[ITSC 89] that are predefined classes. But where the 
security functions to be specified are similar to the 
predefined classes, the statement of functions may be 
derived from those classes. Where the statement will 
wholly include one or more predefined classes, these may 
be referenced. Moreover as technical innovation in the 
field of IT security is rapidly evolving, TOEs can and 
will offer increasingly sophisticated functions in the 
future. It is then envisaged that new predefined classes 
defined as new groups of functions become sufficiently 
common to make such classes worthwhile. 
b) Seven evaluation levels (E0 to E6) are defined for the 
evaluation of the correctness of a TOE. The correctness 
is the certification that the TOE accurately reflects the 
stated security target for a system or product. These 
levels are cumulative, it means that what is required at 
a lower level is also required at a higher level, this 
higher level including supplementary special features. 
Level E0 represents inadequate assurance. 
At level El a security target and an informal description 
of the security architecture of the TOE shall be 
provided. The TOE satisfies its security target. 
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Level E2 requires an informal description of the detailed 
design. 
For level E3 
corresponding 
provided. 
the detail design 
to the security 
and the source code 
functions shall be 
A formal model of the security policy is required for 
level E4. The architectural and detailed design shall use 
a rigourous approach and notation. Vulnerability analysis 
is based upon this rigourous approach. 
A close correspondence between the detailed design and 
the source code is asked at level E5. A vulnerability 
analysis shall be performed using the source code. 
Level E6 requires a formal description of the security 
architecture, consistent with the formal model of the 
security policy. 
c) Evaluation of effectiveness determines whether the 
confidence level established by evaluation of correctness 
remains valid for correctness and effectiveness in 
combination, having regard for the proposed use of the 
TOE in the context of its intended environment. 
Assessment of effectiveness is only performed after 
confidence in correctness has been established. 
It is possible to produce a table (see table 1.2) showing 
the in tended correspondence between the criteria of the 
[ITSEC 90) and those ones of the [DoD 83). 
Table 1.2 
[ITSEC 90] 
[ITSEC 90]). 
Correspondence 
and those 
between 
ones of 
[ITSEC 90] Criteria [DoD 
EO ---> 
Fl, E2 ---> 
F2, E2 ---> 
F3, E3 ---> 
F4, E4 ---> 
F5, E5 ---> 
F5, E6 ---> 
the 
the 
criteria 
[DoD 83] 
83] Class 
D 
Cl 
C2 
Bl 
B2 
B3 
Al 
of the 
(from 
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A product successfully evaluated against the criteria in 
the table 1.2 for a predefined functionality class Fl to 
F5 at an evaluation level not lower than given in the 
table 1.2 should fulfil the requirements of the 
equivalent [DoD 83] class shown in the table. The 
converse relationship, however, cannot be directly 
assumed, due to the wider confidence requirements found 
in these criteria. 
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SECURITY AND AUDIT TRAIL. 
There exist numerous of preventions and countermeasures 
possibilities to counter security violations. This 
chapter focuses the attention on a method that 
principally tries to prevent and detect security 
breaches. This method is the security auditing. 
Trusted computers that claim to respect the C2 to Al 
level requirements of the DoD Trusted Computer System 
Evaluation Criteria [DoD 83) have to provide an audit log 
mechanism. 
2.1. What is ·sECURITY AUDITING· ? 
Security Audi ting is a countermeasure directed towards 
prevention or detection of subversive or accidental 
programming or operational practice. A security audit 
trail is a collection of information that permits to 
retrace the activity of a computer system for security 
purpose. This information is collected by a mechanism 
which logs security-relevant events so that they can be 
monitored at a later time. Audit trails are logged into 
one or more files composed of audit records, each record 
representing an event. 
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2.1.1. Auditable events. 
An event represents a subject acting on an object with a 
certain result. The subject is an active entity wanting 
to receive or act on information. The object is "a 
passive entity which contains or receives information" 
[DoD 83). The action made by the subject on the object is 
characterized by a result indicating the success or the 
failure of the action. This is illustrated by the 
figure 2.1. 
jsubject~j----A-c_t_i_o_n---->IObjectj 
(+ result) 
Figure 2.1 An event : a subject acting on an object 
with a certain result. 
The auditable events required by the C2 Criteria class of 
the DoD are : 
- "Use of identification and authentication 
mechanisms 
- Introduction of objects into a user's address 
space 
- Deletion of objects from a user's address space 
- Actions taken by computer operators and system 
administrators and/or system security officers 
- All security-relevant events." [NCSC 87/1] 
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In addition to the C2 audit requirements, the B1 Criteria 
class requires as auditable events : 
- "Any override of human-readable output markings1 
(including overwrite of sensitivity label 
markings and the turning off of labelling 
capabilities} on paged, hard-copy output devices. 
- Change of 
multi-level} 
device 
designation (single-level to/from 
of any communication channel or I/O 
- Change of sensitivity level (s) associated with a 
single-level communication channel or I/O device 
- Change of range designation of any multi-level 
communication channel or I/O device." [NCSC 87/1] 
In addition to the B1 audit requirements, the B2 Criteria 
class requires as auditable events : 
- "Events that may exercise 
channels." [NCSC 87 /1] 
covert storage 
In addition to the B2 audit requirements, the B3 Criteria 
class requires as auditable events 
- "Events that may indicate an imminent violation 
of the system's security policy (e.g. , exercise 
covert timing channels)." [NCSC 87/1] 
No new audi table event is required at the above classes 
(B3 and Al). 
1 From the level B1 of the [DoD 83], the TCB shall mark the begining and the end of all human-
readable, paged, hardcopy output with human-readable sensitivity labels that properly represent 
the sensitivity of the output. The TCB shall, by default, mark the top and bottom of each page of 
human readable, paged, hardcopy output with human-readable sensitivity labels that properly 
represent the overall sensitivity of the output or that properly represent the sensitivity of the 
information on the page. The TCB shall, by default and in an appropriate manner, mark other forms 
of human-readable sensitivity labels that properly represent the sensitivity of the output. The 
override of these markings defaults shall be auditable by the TCB. 
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2.1.2. Content of an event. 
The composition of an event depends from one audit 
generator to another but the DoD requires that the audit 
events contain at minimum the following information 
- At the C2 class : " 
Date and time of the event 
The unique identifier on whose behalf 
the subject generating the event was 
operating 
Type of event 
Success or failure of the event 
Origin of the request (e.g., terminal 
ID) for identification / authentication 
events 
. Name of the object introduced, 
accessed, or 
address space 
. Description of 
the system 
user I system 
[NCSC 87/1] 
deleted from 
modifications 
administrator 
a user's 
made 
to 
by 
the 
security databases." 
- At the B1 class, the security level of the object 
is to be added at the list of the C2 class. It is 
also recommended, but not required, to supply the 
subject security level. 
No new information is required at the above 
classes (B2, B3 and Al). 
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2.2. Purpose of the Audit Trail. 
The collection of events (audit trail} is to be analysed 
by a security officer - more or less assisted by 
sophisticated tools - to detect possible anomalies that 
could occur in the system. The anomalies could have the 
form of : 
- attempt of unauthorized users to by-pass the 
protection mechanisms, 
- illegal destruction of any information, 
- illegal access to sensitive data, 
- illegal privileges acquired by legal users, 
- wrong use of their privileges by users, 
The audit trail must also act as a deterrent against 
perpetrators. For that goal, it is important that the 
sys tern users understand that the audit mechanism exists 
and what impact it has on them. Without this user's 
understanding, user deterrence and user assurance goals 
of the audit mechanism cannot be achieved. 
2.3. How auditing? 
Audit trails are generated by any mechanism that must be 
able to record the occurrence of security-relevant 
events. 
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2.3.1. The selection of the events. 
Recording all security-relevant events into the audit 
files may produce an unmanageable amount of data 
involving problems of disk space and difficulties to find 
anomalies. The events must be selectively recorded to 
reduce the amount of data and allow efficient analysis. 
Some events, such as some login failures and use of 
privilege are always auditable. Other events, such as 
successful or unsuccessful attempts to gain access to 
sensitive files, can be selected for auditing. The TCSEC 
do not require the recording of any audit data, only the 
ability to record such data. The logging mechanism has to 
pre-select events that are recorded into the audit trail 
while the other events are discarded. This pre-selection 
avoid the audit files to be flooded with events that have 
no security signification or interest. The resulting 
files are called collection files. Moreover the security 
officer can apply post-selections to the collection files 
making easier the evaluation of the audit trail by 
focusing attention to some kind of events, users, 
objects, actions or result, The resulting files are 
called reduction files. 
The selection can be based on the following criteria, 
singly or in combination 
- "selection based on type of auditable event, 
- selection based on user identity, 
- selection based on object identity, 
- selection based on object properties (usually 
security level)" [NCSC 87 /l), 
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2.3.2. The logging mechanisms. 
The enabling of all events could result in a significant 
system degradation in processor speed if the audit 
mechanism is not efficiently implemented. Just the act of 
determining whether an event mediated by the TCB_ is 
subject to audit and whether the event has been marked 
for logging, could take significant processor resources. 
The most used implementation solution for the logging of 
audit records is to initiate a special system call 
immediately after any of the events in the list of 
auditable actions. This type of events are called micro-
events. 
Some audit mechanisms add to this solution the 
possibility for trusted application processes (e.g., 
login) to write directly to the audit device. This 
enables login, for instance, to write a login "audit 
record" to the audit trail rather than letting a login on 
the system be represented as a collection of system calls 
(producing a set of micro-events) required to complete 
the login procedure. This solution has the advantage of 
reducing the amount of audit data written to the audit 
trail and to make the trail more meaningful. Such events 
are called macro-events. 
Sometimes, a subsystem encounters inconsistencies or 
problems that make the writing of an inf orma ti ve audit 
record desirable. That is why some audit mechanisms make 
feasible for privileged subsystems to directly insert 
audit information into the trail. 
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2.3.3. Compaction of the data. 
Another way to resolve the enormous volume of the data is 
to compact the information. The compaction of the audit 
data has two advantages. First the information is encoded 
to reduce the disk space required by collection and 
reduction files, and second the coding restricts read 
accesses to the audit information. But this protection is 
not sufficient. 
2.3.4. Audit trail protection. 
At the C2 class, "the TCB shall be able to protect 
from modification or unauthorized access or destruction 
an audit trail of accesses to the object it protects. The 
audit trail data shall be protected by the TCB so that 
read access to it is limited to those who are authorized 
for audit data." [NTCSEC 85] 
Audit trail software (generator, reduction tools, ... ) , 
as well as the audit trail itself, should be protected 
and should be subject to strict access controls to be 
protected against modifications and unauthorized 
deletions or readings to permit detection and after-the-
fact investigations of security violations. The log 
containing the audit trail data will be writable only by 
the TCB and by processes with the appropriate privileges, 
and be readable only by security privileged people. 
Additionally to the normal file system protection 
mechanisms, some other hardware and software protections 
may be used as : 
- the writing of the audit data on write-once media 
such as optical disks, 
- the use of devices with very small buffers that 
have a maximum protection, 
- the restriction of physical accesses to the 
logging devices, 
- the encryption of the audit data, 
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"At a minimum, the data on the audit trail should be 
considered to be sensitive, and the audit trail itself 
shall be considered to be as sensitive as the most 
sensitive data contained in the system." [NCSC 87/2] 
2.4. Security roles. 
The only people who are authorized to read audit data, 
are those people who have auditor's privileges. The 
auditor is an authorized individual with administrative 
duties, whose duties includes 
- the selection of the events to be audited on the 
system, 
- the modification of the audit flags which enable 
the recording of those events, 
- the analysis of the audit trail. 
In some systems, the auditor's tasks may be dedicated to 
different trusted persons (at least two) to avoid the 
monopolization and the concentration of the auditing 
privileges in the hands of a single person. This measure 
is also important so that embezzlement cannot be 
perpetrated without collusion. Possible lasting damage 
caused by errors made by incompetent employees can be 
minimized, since each "trusted" individual would have 
only a limited role in the entire system. 
2.5. Examples of audit trail mechanisms. 
The next sections presents some audit trail mechanisms in 
terms of 
- the logging mechanisms indicates how the 
auditable events are recorded into the audit 
trail and how the needed information is collected 
from. 
- the solutions to the data 
mechanisms used to reduce 
number of the audit records. 
volume shows some 
the volume and the 
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- the audit data protections explains how the 
audit mechanism and the audit trail are protected 
against unauthorized accesses. 
- the security roles presents which person(s) are 
responsible of the audit trail management. 
At the end of this chapter, table 2.1 
principal characteristics of the audit 
presented in the next sections. 
2.5.1. SAT. 
summarizes the 
trail generators 
The SAT (Security Audit Trail) working on a BS2000 
operating system of SIEMENS NIXDORF INFORMATIONSSYSTEM, 
is a subsystem that supports the logging of security 
relevant pre-selected events in protected files, which 
can be analysed by means of the SATUT post-selection 
evaluator tool producing reduction files and/or result 
reports. The provided functionality covers the 
requirements of C2 class of the Orange Book. 
The logging mechanism: 
The audit events, which represent a subject acting (with 
a result) on an object (see figure 2.1.), are produced by 
calls to the SAT subsystem with the appropriated audit 
information. Furthermore, the data base systems are able 
to write security relevant information into the audit 
trail. 
Solution to the data volume 
To face the problem of the data volume produced by the 
logging of the events, SAT compacts the data contained in 
the audit files. 
Furthermore, the audit mechanism allows the pre-selection 
of audi table events. A security event is logged or not, 
according to the values of the "auditability" attributes 
of the subject (userid), the event-type and the object, 
and the result of the operation (i.e., success, failure 
or both). Note that some events considered as high 
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security relevant are not 
their attributes cannot be 
into the audit trail. 
switchable. 
changed to 
This means that 
be not recorded 
Last but not least, the post-selection is a function 
provided by SATUT which allows the auditor to select, 
from the SAT files, the part of information really 
interesting for his further analysis. But this function 
can be used for the building of an output file that 
replaces the input files and contains only the records 
really needed for the current security analysis. 
Audit data protection 
"All accesses to the SAT-files are logged by an automatic 
setting of their audit attributes. Further more, 
Open/Close/Exchange of SAT files are considered as no 
switchable events and are always logged. 
Security roles 
To ensure trusted roles against possibly threat being 
perpetrated by system security administrator or someone 
involved with the system security, SAT separates the 
auditor's functions from those of the system 
administrator. The "separation of the privileges" and 
"least privilege" principles are maintained by two main 
responsible r6les distributed to perform security 
tasks II 
- The security officer, who is responsible for : 
the availability of the SAT functions, 
the pre-selection of the SAT events to 
be logged in the collection files, 
management of privileges including the 
auditor privilege. 
- The auditor, who is responsible for 
the management of the SAT files, 
including switching of collection files, 
the post-selection of the SAT events 
logged in the collection files, by using 
the SAT evaluator tool." 
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Some users can take part 
attribute of a file-object 
by the file owner only 
authorization is granted 
[SAT 90/1] 
2.5.2. RACF. 
in the auditing : "the audit 
or a FLAM-library can be set 
when he is authorized. This 
by the group-administrator". 
RACF (Resource Access Control Facility) is a program 
product running under a IBM MVS system and satisfying the 
C2 class of the NTCSEC. RACF provides functionalities 
as : 
identification and verification of users, 
user's authorization to access protected 
resources, 
control of the means of access to resources, 
logging and reporting various attempts of 
unauthorized access to protected resources. 
The part in which we are interested is the logging part 
which provides a way to see who is using what resource. 
The logging mechanism 
RACF writes security log records for detected 
unauthorized attempts to enter the system and, 
optionally, for detected authorized or unauthorized 
attempts of access to RACF-protected resources. Other 
auditable events are : identification and authentication 
of users, deletion of resources, and actions taken by 
privileged users. 
Solution to the data volume 
RACF logging options 
restricting logging 
individual resources. 
allow a reduction I/0 activity by 
to specified access levels to 
32 
Chapter 2 Security and Audit Trail 
Audit data protection 
The main protection of the audit data is provided by the 
RACF access control mechanisms. 
Security roles 
The security administrator has the overall responsibility 
for RACF implementation but RACF allows to choose between 
centralized and decentralized control through its ability 
to delegate responsibilities. RACF allows different users 
to perform different security tasks, such as auditing and 
security administration. For example, RACF can optionally 
notify a specified user of an unauthorized access attempt 
to a resource. [RACF 87] 
2.5.3. SMP. 
The SMP (Security Module Package) is a product of 
SECUREWARE Inc. that is designed to enhance and upgrade 
the UNIX operating system, its commands, and its 
utilities to the C2 class of trust as defined by the 
Orange Book. Audit trails produced by this subsystem can 
be used to detect penetrations of the system and the 
misuses of resources. 
The logging mechanism 
Each audit record generated by the subsystem contains the 
user identification with the process effective 
user and group-ids. So the users can be hold 
accountable for their actions. 
and real 
strictly 
The audit subsystem uses system call and utility usage to 
classify user actions into event types. The audit records 
are generated from three sources: 
The kernel audit mechanism a large percentage 
of the audit records stored in the audit trail 
are generated by the kernel audit mechanism. This 
portion of the audit subsystem generates records 
in response to user process system calls that map 
to security-related events. 
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. The trusted application processes : To reduce the 
amount of audit data written to the audit trail 
and to make the trail more meaningful, some 
trusted applications (login, su2, ) are 
permitted to write directly to the audit device. 
The privileged subsystems : sometimes a subsystem 
encounters inconsistencies or problems that make 
the writing of an informative audit record 
desirable. 
Solution to the data volume 
The audit data are compressed in to packed record format 
that is stored in an audit compaction file by the audit 
compaction daemon 3. 
Pre-selection options for record generation can be used 
to fine tune the audit trail. The user actions are 
classified into event types that can be used for 
selective audit generation and reduction. 
The fact that trusted application processes have direct 
access to the audit trail by writing macro events rather 
than sequence of micro events, reduces the number of 
recorded events. 
Audit data protection 
The audit data is maintained by an audit device driver as 
a set of audit collection files that can only be accessed 
by processes which have special privileges. This limits 
the access to the audit device only by trusted utilities 
such as the audit daemon and the audit administrator 
interfaces. 
2 su is the application that evokes super-user privileges. 
3 A daemon is a UNIX process running in background. 
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Security roles 
The SMP audit subsystem is administered by the Audit 
Administrator who adjusts the audit subsystem parameters 
according to the performance and security requirements of 
the site. He is responsible for deciding how much 
information is recorded, how reliable it is recorded and 
for maintaining the information once it is collected. 
[SMP 88] 
2.5.4. AIX. 
AIX is a version of the UNIX opera ting sys tern that runs 
on the IBM RT PC hardware. This UNIX version contains 
security features designed to satisfy both the class C2 
security requirements of the Orange Book and some 
additional security requirements. 
The logging mechanism 
Each event is described by an entry in an event table. 
The figure 2.2 illustrates the concept of an event table. 
Each entry is either a base event or an administrative 
event. A base event is either a system call name (e.g., 
fork) or an event in a trusted process (e.g., login-ok) 
or a non-system-call event in the kernel (e.g., RPC). An 
administrative event (e.g., login or object-create) is a 
convenient macro for an auditor that is defined by a set 
of base events and/ or previously defined adminis tra ti ve 
events. 
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# Example of Event table : 
# Base events : system calls 
access 
fork 
write 
# Base Events : trusted processes 
adduser-fail 
adduser-ok 
# Administrative Events 
login : login-fail, login-ok, logout-ok, 
su-fail, su-ok 
file-create : creat, open, openx 
object-create : file-create, ipc-create, pipe 
Figure 2.2 Event Table Entries. 
Solution to the data volume 
AIX includes audit trail file compression to face the 
produced amount of audit data. 
The possibility to define two types of events (base 
events and administrative events) can reduce the volume 
of audit trails while selecting one of the two types for 
auditing. 
In a same way, it is possible to define two classes of 
users to help the pref i 1 ter (i.e. , selective collection) 
of the audit trail log file records. The two user classes 
are the general class containing, for instance, 
unprivileged (ordinary) users, and the special class that 
may contain privileged (administrative) users. 
Another way provided by AIX to avoid the flooding of the 
audit trail, is the possibility to turn off, or 
temporarily suspend then resume "normal" auditing (e.g., 
system call events) in a privileged process, and cut only 
a few selected records. 
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Audit data protection 
In addition to the compaction of the audit files, the 
audit subsystem may record user and system events on a 
write-once media. 
Security roles 
The two classes of users are defined by the auditor. He 
also associates with each class its own set of audit 
events. The auditor may create new administrative events 
by editing the event table. 
The super-user has the privilege to control the auditing 
subsystem ( enable and disable the auditing, specify the 
audit trail file, ... ). He is the only one who can invoke 
the audit print command to generate audit reports. 
[AIX 88] 
2.5.5. VAX/VMM. 
The VAX/VMM security kernel is implemented as a virtual 
machine monitor (VMM) for the VAX architecture. The 
auditing facility for the VAX security kernel was 
designed and implemented to meet the requirements for an 
Al class (NCSC) secure system. It includes the ability to 
monitor and signal impending security violations, to take 
defensive actions against at tempted security violations 
and, the function in which we are interested to create, 
maintain, and protect an audit trail. 
The logging mechanism 
The virtual machine monitor supports several virtual 
machines simultaneously. These virtual machines are 
considered as untrustworthy subjects. The users are also 
subjects. All subjects are assigned an access class and 
can reference VAX security kernel objects when mandatory 
and discretionary controls allow. The VAX security kernel 
always audits as long as there are subjects on the 
system. 
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The VAX security kernel is constituted of layers, the 
Audit Trail layer being at a low level as shown by the 
figure 2.3. The higher layers audit accesses to the 
objects that they manage (the virtual printer layer 
manages the printers, ... ) . They audit security-relevant 
events by means of a call down to the Audit Trail layer. 
Users 
Virtual Hachine 
Operating 
SysteA 
Security PeriAeter 
Secure Virtual Server VA~ 
Kernel Interface 
Virtual Printers 
Virtual TerAinals 
Uoltlfles 
Files 
Audit Trail 
VAX Ha1•d11are 
Figure 2. 3 VA)(/VJ\1M Layers. 
But not all layers manage objects. A parcel of the 
actions taken by computer operators and system 
administrators and/or system security officers is the use 
of commands calling such layers. Such users also have to 
be audited and that is the reason why audit events can 
also be produced at the command level. This auditing is 
performed after the command completes so that the audit 
record may contain the final resut of the command. 
Solution to the data volume 
The auditing facility allows selectively audit based upon 
user's identity and/or object security level. 
Counters and thresholds can be assigned to subject or 
object. The counters are updated depending on the events 
occurring in the system. When an audit request is sent by 
higher layers to the Audit Trail layer, this last one 
decides whether or not to collect the events into audit 
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buffers based on the value of the audit counters and 
thresholds. However, the Audit Trail layer does provide a 
means by which higher layers may declare especially 
significant events that should be audited regardless of 
any audit thresholds. 
Audit data protection 
Normal users and staff members are prohibited from 
performing functions delegated to the auditor. All of the 
mechanisms within the auditing facility are part of the 
TCB, and are protected by hardware from modification 
outside of the supplied software mechanisms. 
A user with enough privilege can inspect an audit log, 
but can never overwrite its contents. The file system 
safeguards the contents of these files by allowing only 
read access for all opens initiated to them and requiring 
the auditor privilege to delete such files only using the 
supplied software mechanism. 
In addition, all subjects, even the auditor, are always 
audited. 
Security roles 
The control over the audit trail can only be performed by 
the auditor. The auditor privilege allows the setting of 
audit and alarm thresholds as mentioned before and the 
archiving of audit logs. 
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2.6. Conclusion. 
The principal goal of the security audit trail is to be 
analysed to deter, prevent and discover security 
anomalies or breaches. As the activity of each active 
user on the system generates audit records, these records 
are to be evaluated. 
The Orange Book gives some criteria to realize efficient 
security audit trail mechanisms, to log the right 
information in the records, ... but it does not give any 
information about a way to analyse the audit information. 
Because of the volume of the data, this can not be 
entirely handled by a human operator reading the endless 
lists of audit records. Thus, a tool must be provided to 
analyse or help the security officer evaluating the audit 
trail. 
There are several types of tools for this purpose : 
reduction tools or passive 
presented in chapter 3, 
- and automatic analysis 
intelligent" tools, that 
chapter 4. 
tools, that are 
tools or "more 
are described in 
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Table 2.1 Summary of audit trail generators. 
------ ---- -------
----------- ----------
00 4 Logging Selection I Aud it Data Security 
Criteria Mechanisms Data Volume Protection Roles 
------ --------
----------
SAT C2 - calls to the SAT -pre-selection -compaction - security 
subsystem -post-selection -file pro- officer 
Vl. 0 - direct writing by -compaction tection - auditor 
data base systems -direct writing -auditable 
commands 
RACF 81 -selection based -RACF access - security 
on resources, controls admini-
Vl. 9 users strator 
- auditor 
- users 
------ -------- --------------------- ----------- ------------ -----------
SMP 
Vl 
C2 -kernel audit -pre-selection 
mechanism -direct writing 
-trusted applications -post-selection 
-privileged subsystems -compaction 
-access - audit 
limitations admini-
-compaction strator 
----- -------- ----------------- ----------------- ------------ -----------
AIX C2 
VAX/ Al 
VMM 
-base event : system -base and admi-
calls or event in a nistrative 
trusted process events 
-administrative event: -compaction 
set of base events or -classes of users 
administrative events 
-compaction -super-user 
-write-once -auditor 
media 
calls to the audit 
trail layer by the 
-selection based -auditing of - auditor 
on users/objects privileges 
- higher layers 
- command calls. 
security levels people 
-counter and -software/ 
threshold system hardware 
protections 
------ ------- ---------------------- ___________ _., 
__ _._ _________ _ 
4 0.8. is the abreviation for Orange Book (see section 1.2.1 of chapter 1). 
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PASSIVE OR REDUCTION TOOLS. 
A reduction tool is a tool used by the security officer 
to reduce the amount of audit records generated and to 
only keep those ones that are really needed and 
interesting for further analysis. 
An audit reduction tool is passive in that it is a 
combination of query language and data base manager and 
only selects records by applying filters. These filters 
are based on the contents of the fields of the audit 
records and combined with logical operators (AND, OR, 
NOT) . The tool helps the security officer to accomplish 
his tasks, but the evaluation of the audit trail is still 
made by the officer. 
There are some limitations involved by the tools of this 
category : 
- the necessity of dividing (by selection of 
records) the audit trail to evaluate it, because 
of the volume. By such division, some information 
can be lost and anomalies be undetected; 
- the high interconnection between 
difficult, and most of the time 
deep evaluation of the audit 
people; 
the events makes 
not possible, a 
trail by human 
- the few knowledge about known intrusion scenarios 
and the impossibility to analyse all of them 
involves that other methods need to be used to 
detect known and unknown anomalies. 
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3.1. Functions provided to help the evaluation of audit 
trail. 
The reduction tools are often supplied with the audit 
trail generator mechanisms and provide the security 
officer with several functions to analyse the generated 
audit data : 
- selection of the records based on simple criteria 
or composed with "and", "or", "not", and 
brackets, 
- sorting of the records based on one or several 
fields, 
- report writer that makes a list of the anomalies, 
- report generator that lists the selected records 
in a format readable for human operators, 
- some tools provide alarm functions, 
3.2. Kind of activities evaluated with reduction tools. 
Here follow some examples of activities which should be 
evaluated with reduction/analysis tools. These activities 
are described as simple post-selection criteria that 
could be implemented for the evaluation of collection 
files1. These criteria are simple behaviours that are 
unusual or suspicious. There is no relation between the 
audit records. 
1 This study has been made for the evaluation of SAT collection files (under a BS2000 operating 
system) but can be easily extended to any other system. 
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- Detection of users acting (reading, writing) on objects 
of other users. A difference can be made between non-
protected and protected objects2• For examples : 
. execution of other user's protected programs; 
reading, copying of protected files; 
attempts to act on protected files with 
incorrect passwords; 
. deletion of files that are not in the current 
userid3; 
modification (writing) of such files; 
Particularly, all accesses 
userid's (for instance the 
BS2000) must be supervised. 
to sensitive and privileged 
privileged userid $TSOS on 
- Detection of users attempting to 
attributes, system parameters, passwords, 
failure result). 
modify files 
(with a 
- Certain commands and programs can not be executed by 
users who have not enough privileges. But certain 
commands or programs are not execution-protected but are 
not usually used by normal users. These commands and 
programs may be particularly supervised to detect 
misuses. 
- A difference is to be made with those commands that can 
not be used by non-privilege users (audit commands, ... ) 
and for which all accesses must be denied. This will 
result on a sequence of failed actions. 
- Certain erroneous commands should always alarm the 
security officer. These actions will have a failure 
result. For example: someone attempting to modify 
parameters for the selection of audit events that are not 
switchable, 
2 An objection to this criteria could be that if the access control mechanisms work correctly, the 
intruder will not have access to protected objects. But the detection of such activity may 
reinforce the idea that an intrusion attempt is occurring and may allow the detection of who is 
doing what. 3 On a 8S2000 system the userid corresponds to a single directory owned by a user (or group of 
users). 
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- A database will contain information (static profiles) 
about the entire system like : 
workdays and non-working days for the firm and 
for all users (days of week, ... } 
official holiday and users' holiday 
on- and off-hours, off-shift, lunchtime, 
For example, if a user is connected on the system during 
one of his non-working days or during off-hours, he can 
be specially supervised. 
- The result of the action ( success or failure) is very 
important. If a sequence of failed actions is occurring, 
an anomaly is almost certain. 
3.3. Examples of reduction tools. 
The following examples are reduction tools provided by 
the logging mechanisms presented in chapter 2. 
3. 3 .1. SAT. 
The post-selection is that function provided by the SAT-
Evaluator (SATUT) which allows the auditor to select, 
from the SAT files, the part of information really 
interesting for his further analysis. As shown in 
figure 3.1, the use of the SATUT has two main purposes : 
a} The building of an output file (reduction file) 
that replaces the input files (collection files} 
and contains only the records really needed for 
the current evaluation. 
b) The selection from the input file, of the records 
satisfying a post-selection condition, and the 
possibility to issue them on listings or files. 
In this case, the reduction file is simply a mean 
to store the results of the analysis and not to 
replace the input files. 
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The SAT Evaluator provides the principal functions : 
- a selection function, to select from the input 
file(s} the records satisfying some post-
selection conditions and to return the count of 
those record occurrences, 
- an output function, which permits to show the 
selected records on listings, 
and a function to save the selected records in a 
reduction file. 
Audit Trail Generator 
Pre-selection 
File Ha.nagetfent 
SAT-Evaluator 
Forttatting 
Post-selection 
Reduction file 
Figure 3.1 SAT-Evaluator (From design of SAT project 
(SIEMENS)). 
The post-selection criteria are filters applied to the 
audit records. These filters are combined with logical 
operations AND, OR, NOT. The selected events may also be 
sorted based on the content of fields. [SAT 90/1) 
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In addition, alarm functions are provided in the BS2000. 
Alarm functions are a functionality that are no more 
passive but help the security responsible to detect 
anomalies. Security Alarms are real-time 
the auditor that attempts to violate 
policy may be under way. 
notifications to 
system security 
3.3.2. RACF. 
The RACF report writer is able to generate reports that: 
- list the contents of RACF logging records, 
- describe attempts to have access to a particular 
RACF-protected resource, 
- list the warning messages that RACF issues during 
the "grace" period4, 
- list resources activity by resource owner, 
- list the resource owners, 
- describe users and groups activity, 
- summarize system and resources uses. 
These reports contain the user identity, the number and 
type of successful accesses, and the number and type of 
unauthorized accesses. 
The user can request a summary report as well as many 
detailed summary reports. 
Moreover, 
analyst, 
the date, 
to provide relevant information to the 
RACF maintains statistical information 
time, and number of times that a user 
4 The "grace" period is the period of time just before RACF control is enforced. 
security 
such as 
enters a 
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system and the number of time a specific resource was 
used by any user. In data set and general resource 
profiles, RACF optionally records the following 
statistics: 
- the date the resource was last referred, 
- the number of times the resource was used under 
each RACF authority (such as READ or UPDATE), 
- the number of times that a specific user or group 
used the resource, 
- the date the profile was last updated. 
For user profiles, RACF optionally records statistics 
such as: 
- the date and time of the last RACINIT5 for a 
particular user, 
- the number of RACINIT macros issued for a 
particular group, 
- the date and time of the last RACINIT for a user 
to a particular group. 
RACF provides a functionality that is no more passive and 
help in real-time in the detection of anomaly : it is the 
alarm function. For detected attempted security 
violations on the system, RACF sends messages to the 
security console. RACF immediately reports events such as 
detected unauthorized attempts to enter the system and, 
optionally, detected unauthorized attempts to have access 
to RACF-protected resources or modify the contents of the 
RACF data base. Optionally, RACF also notifies a 
specified user of an unauthorized attempt of access to a 
resource. 
RACF is basically an open system in that resources not 
defined to RACF are not protected. Other systems are 
closed systems in which resources not declared as to be 
protected by the systems, are nevertheless protected. 
[RACF 87] 
5 RACINIT is a macro used during the login phase. 
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3.3.3. SMP. 
There is a data reduction/ analysis utility that is 
designed to facilitate the examination of audit trails 
from previous audit sessions or from the current one. The 
reduction utility is able to identify all of the 
compaction files needed to reduce an audit session. 
To analyse an audit trail, the reduce utility supports a 
wide range of post-selection criteria that helps the 
administrator to target specific events, users, or 
objects. [SMP 88] 
3.3.4. AIX. 
The audit print command is only invoked by the super-
user. It reads the audit trail and prints a report. It is 
possible to print all records as well as audit records 
that satisfy to a filter. The selectable options include 
user name (login, real, effective), event name (base or 
administrative), node name, and time (after or before) 
and can be combined with an "AND" . [AIX 8 8] 
3.3.5. VAX/VMM. 
Security alarms are provided 
in addition to the "normal" 
The security alarms are : 
by the VAX security kernel 
analysis or reduction tool. 
- Protection-Violation alarm : that is triggered by 
repeated attempts by a subject to violate 
privileges, mandatory access controls, or 
discretionary access controls, 
- Covert-Channel alarm is 
subject repeatedly uses one 
known, audited covert channels, 
triggered 
of the 
when a 
system's 
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Login-Failure alarm that 
repeatedly failed attempts to 
system. 
is triggered 
log in to 
by 
the 
The "normal" audit reduction utilities provide help, 
through its commands, for security relevant decision. The 
auditor is able to select events based on some qualifiers 
as : 
- before a date and time, 
- after a date and time, 
- produced by an individual (subject), 
- containing a given string, [VAX/VMM 90] 
3.4. Conclusion. 
Looking at the few examples previously presented, it is 
already remarkable that some mechanisms base particularly 
their attention on the logging of the audit records and 
only provide tools with minimum analysis operations : 
record selections, translation into readable format, 
( see SMP, AIX, ... ) . Other mechanisms provide analysis 
tools with functionalities that really aid the security 
officer in evaluating audit trails. 
are the sorting of the records, 
audit files, alarm functions, 
VAX/VMM, ... ) . 
These functionalities 
the re-evaluation of 
( see SAT, RACF, 
Some elaborated tools as automatic 
presented in the following chapter, are 
generator mechanisms. They are able 
files coming from various mechanisms. 
this, the lack of help brought by 
generator mechanisms. 
analysis tools, 
not provided with 
to evaluate audit 
They fill, like 
some audit trail 
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AUTOMATIC ANALYSIS TOOLS. 
As its name indicates, an automatic analysis tool or AAT 
can automatically analyse audit trails or help and guide 
the security officer evaluating audit trails. Such tool 
generally analyses : events or series of events that are 
suspicious or abnormal, user's profiles, behaviours of 
users, statistical data, ... to find anomalies. 
An AAT can bring several solutions to resolve the 
limitations of reduction tools : 
- As the evaluation is made entirely or partially 
by the tool with predefined rules, it is 
theoretically not necessary to divide the audit 
trail by selection of events (or only to reduce 
the evaluation time). All the security-relevant 
information contained in the audit trail can then 
be fully used to detect anomalies. 
The high interconnection between the events is no 
more an obstacle. Methods like behaviour pattern 
recognition describes some (un)expected 
behaviours with well-defined rules for the 
evaluation. 
- Unknown anomalies and the few knowledge about 
known intrusion scenarios 
using other methods 
can be resolved, by 
statistical analysis 
methods, methods that learn (ab) normal profiles 
of user's behaviours, some 
neural networks, 
other 
All these 
sections1. 
methods will be introduced 
1 Methods using neural networks will be introduced in chapter 6. 
methods using 
in the next 
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One way of analysis is to evaluate the audit trail after 
it is recorded, it is called off-line analysis. 
Anomalies, intrusions and break-ins can only be 
discovered after they occur. This technique both detects 
and deters unauthorized actions. It does not prevent such 
actions. 
Another type of analysis evaluates the events as they 
occur. It is thus possible for the tool to prevent 
unauthorized actions by analysing the events in real-
time. This is called on-line analysis. The tool may then 
take an action against the detected anomaly as sending a 
message to the security officer, Therefore the 
security officer or the system itself can immediately 
perform the action to prevent from the discovered 
intruder performing his misuse. 
4.1. Methods used by AATs. 
To be a strong and efficient intrusion-detection system, 
an AAT should incorporate several approaches of 
evaluation, each of them detecting specific and 
particular types of anomaly, even whether some anomalies 
can be indiscriminately detected by several methods. 
The following sections describe, more in details, the 
analysis methods behaviour pattern recognition, 
statistical analysis and learning normal system 
behaviour. First, a little definition and/or description 
of the method is presented. Then one or more examples are 
presented to illustrate the described components 
implementing the method. Third, artificial intelligence 
techniques are developed to illustrate a possible 
solution to the realization of the presented analysis 
metho~ After the presentation of these methods of 
analysis, examples of existing tools or prototypes shows 
the possible interactions between the different methods, 
the reactions that can be taken, and the configurabili ty 
of these tools. 
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4.1.1. Behaviour pattern recognition. 
First of all there are analysis methods detecting single 
events or series of events, in the audit trail, that by 
oneself may be considered as abnormal and that considered 
in isolation are anomalous enough to raise concern. This 
is called behaviour pattern recognition. 
4.1.1.1. What is a behaviour pattern? 
A behaviour pattern analysis component is a mechanism 
capable of evaluating activities of users, systems, and 
objects (files, programs, ... ) and recognizing described 
suspicious behaviours. A behaviour pattern is a 
description of the activity of a user, object or system. 
A behaviour can be represented in the audit trail by a 
single event as well as several consecutive (or not) 
events. The user, system or object behaviour is analysed 
without reference to whether it matches past or expected 
behaviour patterns. The mechanism is intended to detect 
those events that considered in isolation, are 
suspicious. 
The description of such suspicious behaviours is based on 
knowledge of past intrusions and reported attacks, known 
system vulnerabilities, and the installation-specific 
security policy, as well as our intuitions. 
This mechanism represents a superficial level of 
analysis. It operates with a very narrow view of the data 
and is, in some sense, static in its interpretation. It 
is narrow in that it generally involves only a small 
number of data items in its analysis; and it is static in 
that it does not make use of any statistical information. 
In effect, it is intended to detect those audit log 
entries that are, in isolation of any other information, 
anomalous enough to raise concern. 
The security officer has to create some simple or more 
elaborated criteria to describe suspicious and abnormal 
behaviours. 
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The first thing a behaviour analysis component has to do 
is the selection or the detection of event records based 
on simple criteria (i.e., depending on the content of the 
fields of ONE event record). These simple criteria are 
filters and can be combined using "and", "or", "not", and 
brackets. The difference with the reduction tools is that 
variables may be used so that the content of the fields 
of the record representing the event may be compared. 
For instance, a record representing an event where a user 
is accessing a file that belongs to him is described as : 
find a record containing an EVENT-TYPE field with the 
value 'access to file' and a USERID field whose value is 
stored in a variable USER and an OWNER field whose value 
is stored in a variable OWNER. Furthermore, the variable 
USER must be equal to the variable OWNER. 
More elaborated criteria allows the tool to detect simple 
scenarios of attack. Thus it must be able to recognize 
not only single records but a sequence of records or a 
pattern. The pattern could be described as: "a record 
satisfying selection criterion A, followed by a record 
satisfying selection criterion Band finished by a record 
satisfying selection criterion C" [PDAT 89/2], each 
selection criterion being a step in the description of 
the scenario. 
Variables may be used to make relations between the 
fields of the different records. For instance, three 
consecutive unsuccessful logins are considered as 
abnormal if they correspond to the same user. Three 
variables are to be defined, each containing the userid 
of each unsuccessful login record. An anomaly is detected 
if the three variables corresponding to three consecutive 
unsuccessful logins are identical. 
In general it is possible to define behaviour criteria 
whose step can either be selection criteria (filter) or 
behaviour criteria that have been defined beforehand. 
Moreover, any step can be defined by a logical 
conjunction or disjunction of such previously defined 
criteria. 
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4.1.1.2. Some examples. 
The Protocol Data Analysis Tool (PDAT) is a prototype, 
realized by SIEMENS and running on a SINIX system, that 
includes behavioural analysis. At present it is assumed 
that records are analysed off-line. This is possible to 
do this on a computer system different from the one that 
is being audited. It is planed to include functionalities 
which allow on-line analysis, statistical analysis and 
normal user's behaviour that can be learned by the 
system. 
The PDAT was initially designed for the auditing of 
secure computer systems but it is flexible enough to be 
used for test analysing, diagnosis, optimization, 
validation and operational control. The tool is very 
flexible to be configurable with different manufacturers 
generated audit data (with different formats). 
[PDAT 88/1, PDAT 88/2, PDAT 89/1, PDAT 89/2, PDAT 89/3] 
Here follow some criteria that, defined with the PDAT, 
recognize behaviour patterns in audit trails. 
a) The first example illustrates a simple criteria (or 
filter) looking for events that describe unsuccessful 
accesses to protected files. For that goal, the security 
officer has to define criteria filtering records 
containing a event-type field with a value corresponding 
to 'file access' and a result field (result of the 
action) with a value representing an unsuccessful result, 
let's say F for Failed result. In our example, access to 
file will be represented by the events 
FRD for File Read Data, 
FMD for File Modify Data, 
FCL for Close File, 
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The PDAT-format selection criteria are defined as: 
abbrev t~y~p_e __ p~a_t_t_e_r_n 
aO evt 
al evt 
alO evt 
all res 
FRD 
FMD 
FCL 
F 
where the first column is a name or abbreviation given to 
a criterion, the second column is the type of the record 
field (here evt for event-type, res for result) and the 
third column is the pattern that has to match with the 
field value. Then these criteria have to be assembled 
with the logical operators : 
( (aO v al v ... v alO) & a11) 2. 
Notice that wildcards as * for any sequence of characters 
and? for any character, may be used. Supposing that all 
events describing file access, and only those one, begin 
with the letter F, it is then possible to define only two 
criteria equivalent to the above one : 
abbrev type pattern 
aO evt F* 
al res F 
b) The second example introduces the concept of variables 
to compare the field contents of an event record. The 
filter is now "looking for unsuccessful accesses to 
protected files and the file does not belong to the 
acting user". 
2 v is for logical OR and & for logical AND. 
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The same PDAT-format selection criteria are defined as 
before but two variables are introduced 
user_acting that contains the value of the userid 
field of the filtered event records, and 
user_target that contains the value of the owner of 
the accessed file in the filtered 
records. 
Then a relation is 
indicating that the 
owner of the file : 
defined between these two variables 
acting user is to be different of the 
user_acting NOT EQUAL user_target. 
c) The last example illustrates a behaviour pattern that 
recognizes a sequence of events. The behaviour pattern is 
defined to look for more than three consecutive 
unsuccessful logins for the same user. 
The PDAT-format selection criteria are defined as: 
abbrev 
a0 
al 
type 
evt 
res 
pattern 
UCK 
F 
where UCK represent an event that check whether the 
userid and the password correspond together when a user 
logs in. For unsuccessful logins, the result is to be a 
failed result. Then let's name the relation (a0 & al) 
that describes one unsuccessful login : 
unsuccessful_login. 
Now the behaviour is described as three steps, each one 
being an unsuccessful login 
first_step 
second_step 
last_step 
end_behaviour 
unsuccessful_login 
unsuccessful_login 
unsuccessful_login 
successful_login 
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The end_behaviour step describes a successful login that 
permits to only consider consecutive unsuccessful logins. 
Otherwise the tool will detect all users making more than 
three errors while logging in the system. And who has 
never made more than such three errors ? Note that the 
steps can be different criteria. 
We have now to define three variables to impose that the 
three unsuccessful_login criteria are for the same user 
USERl that contains the value of the userid field 
of the first step, 
USER2 that contains the value of the userid field 
of the second step, 
USER3 that contains the value of the userid field 
of the third step, 
Moreover a fourth variable (USER4) 
end_behaviour that has to refer 
also 
the 
associates the 
same user. 
These variables are logically assembled 
USERl EQUAL USER2 
AND 
USERl EQUAL USER3 
AND 
USERl EQUAL USER4 
Some other examples of elaborated behaviour criteria are 
presented in appendix A. 
4.1.1.3. Artificial Intelligence techniques for behaviour 
recognition. 
The architectures of two a~proaches making use of 
artificial intelligence (AI) techniques are now developed 
to resolve the implementation of a behaviour pattern 
recognition analysis component. The first approach 
utilizes simple knowledge base system while the second 
implements an Expert System (ES). 
'I'he figure 
implementing 
with a simple 
4.1 proposes the 
a behaviour pattern 
knowledge base system 
first architecture 
recognition component 
as AI technique. 
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Collection 
file 
(b) 
-Tool 
User interface 
Inference 
P1echanisn 
Figure 4.1 Architecture for behaviour pattern 
recognition. 
In the architecture proposed in the figure 4.1 the event 
records of the collection file are translated into the 
fact base (a}. In a first time, the user can directly 
ask questions to the knowledge base by asserting new 
rules and new facts (b}. In a second time, the questions 
can be asked automatically by the tool by applying the 
more interesting rules found in the first time. These 
rules may describe simple criteria or sequences of events 
that are to be found. 
This is a simple way to use AI techniques. This approach 
allows to search and create new behaviour patterns due to 
the interaction between the tool and the security 
operator. 
Another (more elaborated} solution is to use an expert 
system. First of all the utility of the creation of an 
expert system is introduced by presenting what is an 
expert system and how helpful could be an expert system 
in analysing behaviour patterns. 
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An expert system is a computer program that emulates the 
behaviour of a human expert within a specific domain of 
knowledge. The major characteristics of an expert system 
are : 
- the ability to perform at the level of an expert, 
- the representation of domain-specific knowledge 
in the manner in which the expert thinks the 
expert knowledge is separated from the general-
reasoning mechanism, 
- the incorporation of explanatory mechanisms 
ways of handling uncertainty the E. S. is 
tolerant of errors and imperfect knowledge 
conventional programming, 
and 
more 
than 
- and typically, a prediction for problems that can 
be symbolically represented the knowledge may 
be processed in a manner that is not procedural. 
"Expert systems are helpful in situations where an expert 
is unavailable, where expertise is scarce or expensive, 
or where the decision maker is placed under time and 
pressure cons train ts". [Pars aye 8 8] 
The main components of an expert system are : 
- the knowledge base where facts and rules are 
stored 
facts can be used to refer to either 
permanent or temporary knowledge and are 
stored in a fact base, 
rules combined with facts can be used 
to arrive at conclusions which can be 
used as new facts; the rules are stored 
in a rule base. 
- the inference 
knowledge, 
mechanism that processes the 
- and the user interface that permits communication 
with the user. 
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Other components like the following ones can be added 
- a knowledge acquisition 
interact with the expert to 
of the expert system, 
facility that can 
extend the knowledge 
- an explanation facility that provides to the user 
a justification of the found solution, 
- a self-training facility that 
facts developed by the expert 
knowledge base. [Martin 8 8] 
can assert new 
system into the 
As mentioned in its definition, an expert system has the 
knowledge of an expert human for a specific domain of 
expertise. And what is the security officer, if not an 
expert? And what is audit trail analysis, if not a 
specific domain of expertise? 
Given the architecture of an expert system and the 
separation of the knowledge base and the reasoning 
mechanism, the "data" that are facts and rules stored in 
the knowledge base, are easy to examine, change and 
extend. A characteristic of expert system is that there 
is no necessary programming for how the system uses the 
knowledge that is presented to it. The possibility to 
assert rules or facts without having to implement an 
algorithm is a great advantage because of the necessity 
of updating continually the knowledge of the analysis 
tool. Moreover any facts or rules can be changed at any 
time, and in most cases the change can be made 
independently of one other. 
All attack and intrusion scenarios can not be known and 
introduced in the knowledge of the tool. If a new attack 
scenario is discovered or a specific object or user is to 
be focused, it must be possible to modify, retract or 
assert facts and rules as rapidly as possible. 
Another advantage of expert system is that it can justify 
the solution it has found and it can explain the 
reasoning it made to find this solution. This could be 
helpful in analysing audit trail because of the possible 
uncertainty of the type of an anomaly. A new user or 
somebody performing unusual tasks or making manipulation 
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errors can have a behaviour that is considered as 
suspicious by the system. The security officer can thus 
analyse the justification provided by the expert system 
about the anomaly. 
Expert systems can also deal with uncertain or incomplete 
information. And in some cases, what is more uncertain 
than an intrusion attempt? Imperfections in knowledge 
take a variety of forms a piece of information being 
missing, or a less extreme possibility is that the 
information is likely rather than absolutely certain, or 
that it is vague or imprecise. It must be possible to 
express to the expert system that a rule is not certain 
at 100%, but that is true in, i.e., 75% of the all cases. 
One may know how likely or probable some proposition is, 
without knowing whether the proposition is true or false. 
It must be also possible that the expert system expresses 
the solution it founds with an uncertainty, depending on 
the information hold in the knowledge base. 
Now the different components of the proposed expert 
system are presented. In a first time, a rule-base system 
encodes the knowledge in the form of individualized 
reasoning rules. These rules have a simple form like 
if-then or antecedent-consequent forms. The rule-based 
component is in general simple to managed because of the 
independence of the rules. Small additions are allowed to 
be made incrementally without the necessity of 
understanding the entire control structure. 
We can imagine a rule base composed of rules like 
IF (behaviour pattern A) 
THEN (activate the research of behaviour pattern B) 
IF (behaviour pattern A AND behaviour pattern B) 
THEN (any behaviour pattern C is abnormal) 
or in a more general form : 
IF (behaviour pattern) 
THEN (actions). 
to describe scenarios of attack that are sequences or 
occurrences of events or behaviours. 
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It is also possible to describe more elaborated scenarios 
by using variables to make comparisons between rules. In 
fact, such a system could be implemented by several 
different rules that are interconnected together and make 
reference to other rules and results of researches. 
Moreover it is possible to use static and dynamic tables 
as other sources of information. These tables are links 
that permit interconnections between rules, results and 
the state of the system. 
A static table connected to the tool will contain 
information about the system and its environment. It is 
information which does not depend on a specific session. 
The contents of the static table are rarely changed and 
can only be changed by the operator of the tool. As 
example, a static table may contain the normal location 
of the users (terminal), the full user-name, the address, 
the normal working hours of all users, the public 
holidays, 
The dynamic table will be helpful to maintain a general 
knowledge of the system depending on a specific session. 
It is impossible to store all information about the state 
of the system at a certain point of time in every single 
record so the dynamic information can be stored in a 
table to make reference to other records or events. For 
example, events may only record the relative path of a 
file while the dynamic table contains the current 
directory where the user is working in. The dynamic table 
may contain other information as the current location 
where the user logs in, the task sequence number (TSN), 
the login user id, the active processes, the opened files 
or objects, the active connections, This dynamic 
table is updated by the tool depending on the contents of 
the analysed records. The records have to be worked 
through in sequential manner (sorted by time) since 
information which might modify the internal table, is 
provided via the audit records. 
Both static 
about the 
information 
analysed. 
and dynamic tables 
global state of 
held in the audit 
contain known 
the system 
trail is the 
information 
while the 
one to be 
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The figure 4. 2 describes an architecture where the tool 
is an expert system that guides the research of anomaly 
into the audit trail thanks to the rules stored in the 
rule base and those ones eventually provided by the user. 
Knowledge base----, 
[ill[] I :~!: I 
Dynanic 
table 
(b) 
Tool-----......., 
rejected Select- User 
audit ---Translate interface 
records (c) Inference 
Aechanisri 
Static 
table 
Figure 4.2 Architecture for Expert System method. 
In the architecture proposed by the figure 4.2, the 
knowledge base is composed of : 
. a rule base describing : 
- behaviour pattern rules, 
- actions to be taken, 
- rules added by a user to analyse a 
specific session, 
. a fact base representing: 
- facts that come from the audit trail, 
- new facts added for intermediate 
analysis, ... 
a dynamic table, and 
a static table. 
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To avoid the problem of flooding the knowledge base with 
unnecessary audit records, the event records of the 
collection file are read in by the tool one at a time 
{a). A selection is made depending on the contents of the 
knowledge base. The selected records are translated in 
facts and logged into the knowledge base {b). Reading the 
event records, the tool updates the knowledge base by 
analysing them. The tool can : 
a) ignore the event because of : 
. no utility for the current security analysis, 
the security administrator has not selected this 
type of event (not useful for a certain period of 
time or not relevant for this user, etc.) 
Notice that this kind of selection can be done by the 
pre- and post-selection criteria provided by existing 
audit generator mechanisms, but some events may be 
necessary to update the knowledge base, thus they need to 
be logged in to be analysed, but do not need to be 
translated into the fact base. In figure 4. 2, this is 
represented by the paths (a) and (c). 
b) translate an event record and logs it 
for further analysis. In figure 
represented by the paths (a) and (b). 
in the fact base 
4.2, this is 
c) update the knowledge base (profiles, dynamic and 
static tables, activates new rules, adds new facts, 
... ) and ignore (see a.) or logs (see b.) it. This is 
represented in the figure 4.2 by the paths (a) and (b) 
for the update and (a) and (c) for the reject of the 
event record. 
Then, depending on the contents of the knowledge base, 
the tool can take actions such as alerting the security 
officer, shutting down a task or the system, 
The user can act on the selection of event records. He 
can also assert new facts and new rules in the knowledge 
base. He can interact with the inference mechanism and 
supply heuristic. 
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If we consider the last architecture (figure 4.2) and add 
more useful components relating to expert systems as 
described in section 4.1.1.3, we obtain the architecture 
shown by the figure 4.3. 
Explanation 
Facility 
Collection 
File 
Fact Base 
Rule Base 
Dyna111ic & 
Static Tables 
Expert 
Knowledge 
Acquisition 
nterface 
Figure 4.3 Architecture and expert system components. 
4.1.2. Statistical methods. 
4.1.2.1. What is statistical method? 
The behaviour pattern recognition analysis method allows 
the recognition of well-defined scenarios of attack. But 
as previously mentioned this is not sufficient because of 
the continually-renovated imagination of the intruders. 
Rather than describing abnormal activities to be found, 
statistical methods can be used to determine normal 
system behaviours. These normal behaviours are summarized 
with some statistical values in terms of mean, variance, 
standard deviation, so that anomalies can be 
detected by comparing these computed values and the 
measured ones. It is, for instance, possible to analyse 
the number of time selection criteria or behaviour 
criteria occur, then this number can be compared with a 
certain threshold value. 
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By using statistical methods, it is also possible to 
analyse the content of records satisfying certain 
criteria. Statistical measures can therefore be computed 
based on the content of fields of the audit records 3. 
4.1.2.2. Some examples. 
As an example analysing the occurrence of event records, 
the rate of unsuccessful login attempts among all login 
attempts can be compared with a certain value. If this 
rate suddenly increases considerably, a break-in at tempt 
is almost certain by guessing passwords. Note that this 
approach can detect a high rate of failed logins involved 
by erroneous passwords for one user id, but it can also 
detect a high rate of login failures based on somebody 
at tempting to enter the sys tern by applying one possible 
password to all userid. 
The second example illustrates 
contents of records satisfying 
might be interested in the login 
the analysis of the 
certain criteria. "One 
time of the users. Thus 
one might activate the selection criterion selecting all 
successful login attempts. The statistical method would 
be to find the average login time and the variance of it. 
A great discrepancy between the actual login time and 
computed average login time may indicate that an illegal 
user has logged in under a legal user name." [POAT 89/2] 
4.1.2.3. Artificial Intelligence Techniques for 
statistical methods. 
Artificial intelligence techniques are not required for 
the statistical analysis of audit trails. Some 
statistical values relating to behaviour patterns may be 
computed in relation with AI techniques presented in the 
previous architectures of figures 4.1 and 4.2. 
3 Note that statistical methods are especially used by the "learning normal system behaviour" 
approach that is described later in this chapter. 
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4.1.3. "Learning normal system behaviour• method. 
4.1.3.1. What is 0 learning normal system behaviour" 
method? 
A component that learns normal system behaviours uses 
statistical analysis methods. The idea is to measure 
particular features of the audit trail, and compare these 
measurements with historical activity. It is possible to 
determine historical activities for users, but also for 
the system in general and for files or any objects 
(programs, resources, ... ) . Historical activity can also 
be defined for subject-object relations. This means that 
a certain behaviour is to be maintained for a specific 
user or group of users having access to a specific object 
or class of objects. 
The statistical analysis component maintains statistical 
knowledge about subjects consisting of profiles 
(representing the historical activity}. A profile is a 
description of a subject's normal (expected) behaviour 
with respect to a set of intrusion-detection measures as 
this is described in the next section. Profiles require a 
minimum amount of storage while keeping only statistics 
such as frequency tables, means, and 
user's work-profile might consist 
derived from his job description, 
continually updated summary of the 
historical activity. 
covariances. Thus a 
of a description 
augmented with a 
user's individual 
The statistical knowledge is updated by adaptively 
learning subject's behaviour patterns. As subjects alter 
their behaviours, their corresponding profiles change. 
Usually, the statistical analysis component will keep a 
knowledge of past user behaviour and compare it to the 
actual behaviour. The knowledge about past behaviour 
should be kept in such a way that the information should 
be weighted to differentiate old behaviour and more 
recent one. "Behaviour of a system a year ago is not as 
useful in trying to establish normal system behaviour as 
the behaviour of the past 24 hours'' [PDAT 89/2]. 
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It is possible to determine whether observed behaviour as 
reported in the audit data is normal with respect to past 
or acceptable behaviour characterized by specific 
intrusion-detection measures. The IDES 4 analysis tool 
proposes two types of measures : 
a} "Continuous measure ( also referred as ordinal} is a 
count of some numerically quantifiable aspect of 
observed behaviour" [IDES 90/1). 
It is for example a "connected time" 
records the duration of a user session , 
time" recording the amount of processing 
activities, 
measure that 
"CPU and I/0 
time and I/O 
b} "Discrete measure (also known as categorical} is a 
function of observed behaviour over a finite set of 
categories. Its score value is determined by its 
frequency relative to other categories. 
It is 
login 
binary categorical measure has a 
that does not count the number of 
category of behaviour occurs, but 
not the category was invoked. 
score function 
times that each 
only whether or 
linear categorical measure has a score function 
that counts the number of times each category of 
behaviour occurs." [IDES 90/1) 
for instance, the "time of login" that records the 
time each time a user logs on, the "location of 
that records the physical location when a user login" 
logs on, 
The measures are applied to individual sessions (i.e. , 
from login to logout} , to days, to hours, or to other 
time periods, depending on the measure and on the type of 
subject. 
4 The Intrusion-Detection Expert System (IDES) is presented in setion 4.2. 
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The measures are to be compared with an historic. This 
comparison is performed by models. A model is the 
function which compares the profile values with the 
measured values. If a current value does not correspond 
to a defined profile, a violation is produced. A 
violation is a way to signalize an anomaly. A warning 
count (rating) linked to a user or group of users is 
incremented depending on the seriousness of the anomaly. 
More precisely, 
variable x and 
statistical model 
when one has 
n observations 
of x is going 
new observation xn+l is normal or 
previous observations. 
a metric for a random 
named x 1 to xn, the 
to determine whether a 
not with respect to the 
Depending on the measure, different models may be used 
- The Operational Model : 
The new observation xn+l is compared with fixed 
limits. The previous observation of x are not 
used and the limits are determined by experience 
or intuition. 
For example an event counter for 
password failures during a brief 
more than 10, suggests an attempted 
the number of 
period, where 
break-in. 
- The Mean and Standard Deviation Model 
The new observation is compared with the prior 
observations x 1 to Xn from which the mean and the 
standard deviation are calculated. The new 
observation Xn+l is defined to be abnormal if it 
falls outside a confidence interval that is a 
standard deviation from the mean for some 
parameter d : 
mean± d * stddev 
where sum= x 1 + ... + xn 
sumsquare = x 1
2 + ... + xn 2 
mean= sum/ n 
stddev = sqrt (sumsquare / (n-1) - mean 2 ) 
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Deviation the basic average is maintained to 
determine deviation from the mean. To save space, 
a close approximation can be computed with old 
average and the new value. The length of history 
needs to be recorded to ensure proper weighting 
of the new value into the average. 
- The Markov Process Model : 
The Markov Process Model applies only to event 
counters. Each distinct event type (audit record) 
is regarded as a state variable. A state 
transition matrix is used to characterize the 
transition frequencies between states (rather 
than just the frequencies of the individual 
states taken separately). New observations are 
considered as abnormal if its probability (as 
determined by the previous state and the 
transition matrix) is too low. "This model might 
be useful for looking at transitions between 
certain commands where command sequences were 
important." [IDES 87/1] 
- The Time Series Model : 
This model uses an interval timer together with 
an event counter or resource measures. It takes 
into account the order and interarrival times of 
the observations x 1 , ... , xn, as well as their 
values. A new observation is considered as 
abnormal if its probability of occurring at that 
time is too low. 
- Other models like exponential model, multivariate 
model, . . . can be used. [ IDES 90, MIDAS 8 8] 
4.1.3.2. Some examples. 
Some profiles of "normal 
appendix B. Appendix B1, 
behaviour" 
B2, B3 and 
presents profiles for users, system, 
subject-object relations. 
are listed in 
B4 respectively 
objects, and 
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As a practical part of this thesis, a prototype has been 
realized implementing a learning normal system behaviour 
component. This prototype, illustrating the use of 
profiles as previously described, is presented in 
chapter 5. 
There exist other methods that make other uses of 
profiles to learn system behaviours. Two tools TIM and 
Keystroke dynamics illustrate these other learning 
approaches. 
a) 'rIM. 
A time-based inductive learning approach has the 
potential of detecting masqueraders or misfeasors based 
on deviations from the known sequential patterns of a 
user. TIM (Time-based Inductive Machine) discovers 
temporal patterns in the form of sequential decision 
rules generalized from input data called episodes. This 
set of hypotheses is maintained and modified dynamically. 
TIM was originally developed as a general-purpose tool to 
discover temporal patterns 
temporal process, where the 
repetitive activities and can 
high accuracy. 
from observations of a 
patterns represent highly 
be used for prediction with 
TIM always attempts to find better hypotheses as long as 
it receives input data (sequence of events). TIM attempts 
to generate rules that accurately predict the occurrence 
of a specific type of events. 
TIM can be applied to security auditing. It can be used 
to generate rules that predict the occurrences of certain 
specified events. 
Auditing events are processed as soon as they are 
received. Security event rules generated via TIM, 
describe the behaviour patterns of either a user or a 
group of users based on past security audit history. 
Furthermore, 
that predicts 
accuracy. 
each rule describes a sequential pattern 
the next possible events with satisfactory 
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An example of a specified rule produced in TIM follows 
El-E2-E3 --> (E4=95% ; E5=5%) 
where El, E2, E3, E4 and E5 are security events in the 
form of rules. The rule indicates that if El is followed 
by E2, and E2 is followed by E3, then there is 9590 chance 
that E4 will follow and 5% chance that E5 will follow. 
More advanced rules can be generated. For instance, 
El- * --> (E2=100%) 
where * matches any single event. Any number of *'sin a 
rule is allowed. 
Assuming that 
the following 
event : 
sequential rules are to be discovered from 
events where each letter represents an 
A-B-C-S-T-S-T-A-B-C-A-B-C 
the following rules may be generated 
Rl 
R2 
R3 
R4 
A-B 
C 
s 
T 
--> (C 
--> ( s 
--> (T 
--> (A 
= 100%) 
= 50% ; A = 50%) 
= 100%) 
= 50% s -- 50%) 
R2 and R4 may be deleted from the rule base eventually, 
because they may lead to wildly divergent predictions and 
are not "good" hypotheses. 
Rl and RJ may remain in the user profile, because they 
seemed to cover or explain more events more accurately, 
and could be used for deviation detection in the future. 
detections and detections of Deviation 
activities can determine unusual activity. 
Rl : A·-B -·- > ( C=l00%) 
unrecognized 
For example : 
and then the sequence of events A-B-D will be considered 
a violation of the pattern. 
The sequence of events A-C-F will be considered as 
unrecognized activities. 
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Such activities can be presented to security management 
for further examination. These activities could also be 
used to generate new rules. [TIM 90] 
b) Keystroke dynamics. 
Some systems use a keystroke dynamics mechanism. This is 
an extreme example of the use of artificial intelligence 
in automatic analysis tools. A keystroke dynamics is 
based on the "fit of sender" concept from the days of the 
telegraph when Morse Code operators could identify a 
sender by listening to the incoming signals. Some tools 
use over 110 typing characteristics, including intervals, 
rhythm, an analog of pressure, and error characteristics. 
4.1.3.3. Artificial Intelligence Techniques to learn 
normal behaviour. 
The use of AI techniques are illustrated by the prototype 
presented in chapter 5. It is the implementation of a 
knowledge base ( fact base and rule base) in the PROLOG 
language. 
4.2. Combination of the analysis methods. 
The conclusion that an intrusion attempt is occurring is 
to be made very carefully to avoid false alarms. It is 
not possible and of no use to detect all anomalies that 
possibly may occur on the system. It is not possible in 
that misfeasors always imagine new attacks against a 
given security sys tern mechanism. The goal of an AAT is 
not to detect 100% of the anomalies occurring in the 
system. It must detect the greater number of breaches as 
possible avoiding false alarms. If a too big number of 
false alarms warns the security officer, this one will no 
longer have trust in the AAT. Not all anomalies have to 
be discovered because all of them do not cause damages to 
a given system. A second reason is that an AAT acts in a 
great part as a deterrent against ill-disposed people. 
74 
Chapter 4 Automatic Analysis Tools. 
To be a strong intrusion-detection system that detects a 
great number of "attacks" with a small number of false 
alarms, an AAT should incorporate several different 
approaches of analysis. For instance a statistical user 
profile approach that detects some unknown "attacks", 
augmented with a behaviour pattern recognition method 
that characterizes well-known intrusions, promise to be 
an effective combination. The different components may 
operate in parallel, sharing the same source of audit 
records and producing similar anomaly reports, but with 
the internal processing of the two systems done in 
isolation. At some point a resolver may be introduced to 
combine and further post-process the outputs of the 
components as shown by the figure 4.4. 
Audit Trail 
in ,.--------i-n-+1---------i-n ...... l-> · · · 
V V V 
behaviour 
pattern 
recognition 
out 
in 
V 
statistics 
out 
in 
V 
in 
V 
RESOLVER 
out 
V 
Anomaly '? 
learning 
normal 
behaviour 
out 
Figure 4.4 Combination of the different analysis 
components. 
The PDAT, presented is section 4. 1 .1. 2, plans to 
incorporate in the future several analysis methods as 
behavioural pattern recognition, statistical and learning 
normal system behaviour methods. Two other tools : IDES 
and MIDAS already combine several methods of anomaly 
detection. 
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a) IDES 
The idea of the Intrusion-Detection Expert System (IDES) 
is to use innovative statistical algorithms for anomaly 
detection, as well as an expert system that encodes known 
intrusion scenarios. IDES is designed to operate in real 
time to detect intrusions as they occur. IDES can analyse 
audit trails of other target machines that are entirely 
responsible of the logging mechanism. 
The IDES system is based on two approaches: 
- intrusions can be detected by flagging departures 
from historically established norms of behaviour 
for individual users, and 
- known intrusion scenarios, known system 
vulnerabilities, and other violations of a 
system's intended security policy are best 
detected through the use of an expert system rule 
base. 
The IDES statistical anomaly 
maintains a statistical knowledge 
consisting of profiles. A profile 
subject's normal (i.e.: expected) 
to a set of intrusion-detection 
measures used by IDES are 
detector (IDES/STAT) 
base about subjects, 
is a description of a 
behaviour with respect 
measures 5. Examples of 
"I/O usage", "CPU usage" that indicate the amount 
of I/O usage and CPU usage by a particular user, 
"physical location of use" that records the 
number of times a user is connected to the target 
system from different locations, 
The IDES/STAT adaptively learns subject's behaviour 
patterns: as subjects alter their behaviours, their 
corresponding profiles change. The IDES/STAT is driven by 
the arrival of audit records and by examining them as 
they arrive from the target system. It is able to 
determine through a variety of statistical algorithms 
whether the observed activity is abnormal with respect to 
the profiles. 
See section 4.1.J.l. 
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The expert system component of IDES evaluates user's 
behaviour on the basis of a set of rules. These rules 
describe suspicious behaviours based on knowledge of past 
intrusions, known system vulnerabilities, and the 
installation-specific security policy. The IDES expert 
system component operates in parallel with the 
statistical component. It is planned to introduce a 
resolver to combine the outputs of the two components. 
[IDES 87/1] [IDES 87/2] [IDES 88) [IDES 90/1] [IDES 90/2] 
b) MIDAS 
The Multics Intrusion Detection and Alerting System 
(MIDAS) approach to detect intrusions is developed as an 
intrusion-detection system ( expert sys tern) that encodes 
a-priori rules that define an intrusion. An activity is 
evaluated by comparing norms derived from past activity 
aggregation to on-going actions. The current activity is 
then determined as abnormal if it is outside some 
standard deviation. 
MIDAS monitors at the user command line level and logs 
all commands used. Midas is implemented on a stand-alone 
symbolic LISP machine. It uses a home-grown expert system 
shell. Its rules are elaborated in LISP, and statistical 
user profiles are maintained in LISP structures. 
Midas uses three types of heuristic rules : 
- immediate attack heuristics are intended to 
detect those events that considered in isolation, 
are suspicious. These rules make no use of 
information of past or expected user behaviours. 
- user anomaly heuristics use statistical user's 
profiles to detect when a user's behaviour 
departs from a pattern established by observing 
past behaviours. User's profiles are updated at 
the completion of a user session. The profiles 
contain a list of the user's usual commands, the 
usual access times and location for the user, and 
the expected typing rate for the user. MIDAS also 
profiles 
systems. 
the observed behaviours of remote 
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- system-wide state heuristics defined system-wide 
profiles maintained to characterize what is 
normal for the system globally. 
MIDAS combines different intrusion indicators to decide 
whether an intrusion is occurring. A login time unusual 
for a given user, for example, is not alone sufficient to 
raise an alarm; but if combined with other anomalous 
data, MIDAS might decide an intrusion was in progress. 
In its current implementation, audit data are dumped to 
tape and then fed into MIDAS. A real-time capability is 
planned for a later implementation phase. [MIDAS 88] 
4.3. Actions taken by AAT. 
The comparison between the measurements and the 
historical activity records does not directly reveal 
misuse, but rather indicates a degree of concern or a 
warning count. The system, objects and users can be given 
a suspicion rating. This rating starts at zero and is 
incremented with each observation of suspicious or 
improper behaviour. The incremented amount is dependent 
upon the seriousness of the observed mis-behaviour. When 
the rating of a particular user, object or system exceeds 
a pre-set threshold value, an anomaly report is 
generated. It could be useful that a textual 
justification of the conclusion was generated. 
As an anomaly is 
performed. These 
responsible by : 
detected by the AAT, actions 
actions may alert the 
is to be 
security 
- sending of message to the security console, 
- writing a message into a file, 
- sounding an alarm, 
so that he can analyse the seriousness of the warning and 
take the best counter-measure. 
78 
Chapter 4 Automatic Analysis Tools. 
Another type of actions may directly respond to an 
11 at tack II if the anomaly can be detected with accuracy. 
These automatic actions may be, for instance : 
- to shut down the system, a specific terminal or 
session; 
- to close down a certain service; 
- to strengthen the protection mechanisms by 
limiting access to objects; 
- to modify a knowledge or data base; 
- to modify the logging selection of events in the 
audit trail as the activation or the cancelling 
of pre- or post-selection criteria for example, 
if the activity of a user is not totally recorded 
into audit files and if a certain kind of anomaly 
occurs for this user, then it should be possible 
to automatically modify the (pre) selections and 
therefore logs all events in the trail for this 
user; 
- as previously mentioned in expert 
actions may also activate new rules 
for more specific intrusions, ... } 
dynamically change elaborated criteria; 
systems, 
(searching 
and then 
Automatic (re} actions only have sense with on-line 
analysis, trying to thwart the misfeasor or the intruder. 
The actions performed as part of off-line analysis act 
principally as mending, and as detection of the 
perpetrator identity. 
The great - alredy-mentioned - problem of automatic 
actions is the false alarms. One possibility reducing 
false alarms is the use of violation rate associated with 
each user. When an anomaly is detected for a given user, 
a warning is not directly sent but a rate is incremented 
with a value depending on the seriousness of the anomaly. 
It is only when the violation rate of the user reaches a 
threshold that an action is to be performed. With such 
method, different intrusion indicators have to occur to 
decide whether an intrusion is performed. A login time 
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unusual for a given user, for example, is not alone 
sufficient to raise an alarm; but if combined with other 
anomalous data, the AAT might decide an intrusion was in 
progress. 
4.4. Configurability. 
An AAT has to be configurable enough to analyse systems 
in heterogeneous environments, while security threats can 
have vastly differing significance for different systems. 
For some public databases systems, unauthorized access to 
information represents little or no threat, while for 
some banks, military command and control systems, it 
represents a severe at tack Some other sys terns have to 
be protected against external intrusions while other 
systems have to be safeguarded against breaches of 
internal users. 
Any AAT must provide a way for a security officer of a 
specific sys tern to create his own criteria of research 
and define his own normal or expected behaviours. 
Moreover, in some system environments (banks, ... ) , the 
expected behaviours of the users are supposed to be the 
same during all the time. In other environments (research 
and development centers, ... ) , the activity of the users 
is modified depending of the work they do, so that in 
some cases, the profiles describing normal user 
behaviours have to be flexible and adaptable. 
4.5. Summary of the presented AATs. 
'I'he table 4 .1 summarizes and compares the AATs ( PDAT, 
IDES, MIDAS and TIM) presented in the previous sections 
in terms of the performed activities, the main components 
{ analysis methods) being part of the AAT, the main mode 
of analysis (off/on-line}, some particularities of the 
tool or the methods employed to evaluate audit trails, 
and, finally, what is planned in the future for these 
AATs. 
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Table 4.1 Summary of AATs. 
PDAT 
Activities 
.auditing of secure 
computer systems 
.possibility of : 
-test analysing 
diagnosis 
-optimization 
-validation 
-operational control 
IDES .evaluation of audit 
trail 
----- --·-----
MIDAS .logging of events 
.detection of 
intrusions 
TIM .general purpose tool 
to discover temporal 
patterns from 
observations of 
temporal process 
.can be used to 
detect masqueraders 
or misfeasors 
(security auditing) 
Components 
.Behaviour pattern 
analysis : 
- filters 
- behaviours 
- variables 
.Statistical algori-
thm (user's profile) 
.Expert system 
(known intrusion 
scenarios) 
The two components 
analyse audit trail 
in isolation 
Mode Particularity 
off- .other target 
line systems 
.maintains 
-dynamic and 
static tables 
on- .other target 
line systems 
.maintains 
profiles of 
subjects 
Future 
.Statistical analysis 
.Learning normal 
system behaviour 
.on-line analysis 
.lleural network 
component 
.Resolver to co1bine 
the analyse of the 
2 components and 
post-process them 
+---------------- ----- ----------------,----------------
.Intrusion detection 
system (expert 
system) that encodes 
a-priori rules 
.Use of past activity 
knowledge 
(statistical user's 
profiles) 
.Includes an expla-
nation facility 
off- .logs at the user .on-line analysis 
line command line 
level 
.combines 
different intru-
sion indicators 
to decide whether 
an intrusion is 
occurring 
.Time based inductive on- .try to predict 
learning approach line occurrence of 
certain specified 
events 
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4.6. Conclusion. 
At the present, AATs are a great help for people who are 
responsible of analysing security audit trails. In some 
advanced cases, the security officer can be helped to 
take a decision about the reaction to a specific breach. 
AATs are not able to realize automatically and totally 
the task of evaluating audit trails. A human operator has 
to decide whether a suspicious activity is effectively an 
anomaly. It is of a great importance that AATs must have 
several approaches of evaluation whose 
analysed by a human individual or 
component (resolver). 
outputs have to be 
by a specialized 
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PROTOTYPING-REALIZATION OF A COMPONENT FOR THE 
RECOGNITION OF (AB)NORMAL BEHAVIOURS. 
This chapter presents a prototype realized to show the 
feasibility of a "learning normal system behaviour" 
component using statistical analysis methods as described 
in section 4.1.3 of chapter 4. 
The prototype implements a "learning normal system 
behaviour" component using statistical methods and 
profiles to characterize normal users, objects and 
systems behaviours. It is implemented in PROLOG language 
and is running on a SINIX machine independently of the 
system generating the audit trail : in this case, the SAT1 
(Security Audit Trail) of a BS2000 operating system. 
5 .1. The components of the prototype. 
The most important components being part of the prototype 
are now discussed they are the input to be analysed 
( the audit trai 1) , the profiles that retain the 
historical knowledge, and the rules that actually 
maintain the profiles and evaluate the audit trail. 
5.1.1. The input. 
The input of the prototype is a collection file (audit 
trai 1) created by any audit trai 1 generation mechanism. 
It is under the responsibility of this mechanism to 
provide the file to be analysed in a given prototype-
readable format. So, a utility first translates the SAT 
collection file to be analysed in a sequence of PROLOG 
lists (the prototype-readable format), each list 
1 See section 2.5.1 of chapter 2. 
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corresponding to an audit record. The SAT event records 
are composed of fixed and variable parts. The fixed part 
is composed of fields containing information that exists 
for all records (userid, timestamp, ... ) . The variable 
part contains only the information that has a meaning for 
the type of the logged event. For example, it does not 
make any sense to keep a field containing a filename for 
a login event because no file is directly concerned. The 
variable part of the record is also referred as the 
information part. 
The prototype-readable format of an audit record is 
[ field_name 1 (information_l), 
field_name_J (information_J), 
... , 
field __ name_J+l ( information_J+l) , 
field_narne_N (information_N) 
•••I 
where the field_name_i are the names of the fields and 
information_i are the corresponding values of the 
information (with i going from 1 to N). The fields 1 to J 
are the fixed part while the fields J+l to N are the 
variable part of the record. Here follows a concrete 
example of two audit record in a PROLOG list format 2 : 
( [user id (Peter) , 
tsn(opiu), 
date(0l-01-91), 
time(09h30m15s03), 
event-type(login), 
result{success), 
station ( terminal 0012) ] ) . 
( [userid (Peter) , 
tsn(opiu), 
date(Ol-01-91), 
time(09h30m21s08), 
event-type(file access), 
result(success), 
file-narne(newdata), 
access(input-output) ] ) . 
fixed 
part 
variable 
part 
fixed 
part 
variable 
part 
2 These formats are not exactly those used by the prototype, but are simplified to be 
understandable. 
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The six first elements of each event list are the fixed 
part : the user identification, the identification of the 
task3 on which the user is logged, the date and time of 
the action, the type and the result of the action. In the 
first record example illustrating a login action, the 
variable part contains the location where the user has 
logged in, and in the second record example illustrating 
a file access action, the variable part contains the name 
of the file and the type of file access. 
5.1.2. The profiles. 
The profiles are the "memory" of the analysis component. 
The prototype learns about the behaviours of the users 
( also of objects and systems) , it retains the "normal" 
activity and updates this knowledge when the behaviour 
changes slowly. In other words, the profiles contain the 
historical past activities of the analysed subjects so 
that normal or expected behaviours can be recognized. 
Appendix B gives some typical examples of profiles that 
are interesting to implement in secure systems. 
5.1.2.1. The profile format. 
A profile is a PROLOG fact of the form 
profile(variable_name, 
event_type_pattern_list, 
result, 
user_pattern, 
information_pattern_list, 
variable_type, 
threshold, 
value). 
3 tsn is for task sequence number. 
1rst part 
2nd part 
3 th part 
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The profiles are composed of three parts 
a} the first part contains one element 
- variable_name that is the name of the profile. 
b) the second part is composed of elements describing the 
event records that will be used to update the 
profile : 
event_type_pattern_list that :i.s a list of 
patterns that have to match with the event field 
of the current analysed record. The elements of 
this list are logically combined with an OR 
operator. It means that at least one element of 
the list has to match the event field of the 
current record. Wildcards such as * ? may be 
used. 
- result that 
result field 
may be used. 
is the pattern that has to match the 
of the analysed record. Wildcards 
- user_pattern that is the pattern that has to 
match the user field of the current record. This 
pattern may contain wildcards. 
information_pattern_list that is a list of 
patterns where all patterns mentioned have to 
match the corresponding fields in the variable 
part of the current record. The elements of this 
list are logically combined with an AND operator. 
c} the third part contains the actual knowledge of the 
profile : 
- variable_type that is the name of the type of the 
profile. The updating and the checking of the 
profile depend directly of this parameter. The 
variable type determines the type of measure and 
the model used. 
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As a 
threshold that is a value or a list of values 
( depending on the variable_type) that 
parameterize the checking of the profile. For 
instance, for the operational model, the 
threshold parameter contains a threshold value (a 
fixed limit). In the mean and standard deviation 
model, the threshold parameter contains the value 
of a parameter d4 used to determine the confidence 
interval. 
- value that is a value or a list of values 
describing the profile. Particularly, using the 
operational model, the value parameter is the 
current value of the profile. Using the mean and 
standard deviation model, the value parameter is 
a list of values describing the history of a 
behaviour. The values of this list are used to 
compute all parameters needed (sum, sumsquare, 
mean, standard deviation, ... ) to determine the 
normality of the analysed measure. The number of 
elements in the list may changed depending on the 
wanted length of the history. 
first example, a profile for the user "user 
-
1" 
concerning his failed logins may be created to check 
whether the number of failed 
not exceed a certain threshold 
The profile is : 
profile(failed_login, 
[evt ( 'JBE' ) , evt ( 'JDE')] , 
res ( 'F'), 
[userid('USER_l ')], 
[], 
test_threshold, 
10, 
7) • 
logins for this 
on a daily base. 
% variable name 
% list of event patterns 
% result pattern 
% list of one user pattern 
user 
% empty list of information pattern 
% type of treatment 
% threshold value 
% current value of the profile 
does 
The list of event patterns refers to the event field with 
a value of JBE (Job Batch Enable) or a value of JDE (Job 
Dialogue Enable) that correspond to a login event. 
The result pat tern refers to the result field with a 
value 'F' ( failed result) . 
4 See section 4.1.3.1 of chapter 4. 
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The list of user patterns contains only one user 
referring to the userid field of the record. 
The list of information patterns is empty for this 
profile meaning that the variable part of the record is 
not interesting for this profile. 
All records satisfying those four description parameters 
will be selected for the profile updating and checking. 
Other examples of profiles are provided in appendix C. 
5.1.2.2. The variable types. 
The variable type parameter of a profile is that 
parameter that is the name of the abstract data type that 
defines a particular type of measure 5 and statistical 
model 6 • So, this variable determines the treatment 
( initialization, updating, checking) imposed to the 
profile. The implemented models are the operational model 
and the mean and standard deviation model. Other models 
like exponential model, multivariate model, markov 
process model, time series model may be used but are not 
yet implemented. 
There are three implemented 
moment (see appendix C) 
variable types at the 
a) The test-threshold type uses the operational model. 
The profiles corresponding to this type counts the 
number of time a described event record pattern 
occurs. The pattern is described in the second part of 
the profile. Then the measured number of occurrence is 
compared with a fixed threshold value . 
. See section 4.1.3.1 of chapter 4. 
b See section 4.1.J.1 of chapter 4. 
88 
Chapter 5 Prototyping-realization , .. 
b) The mean-of-time-for-session type 
standard deviation model with 
uses the 
continuous 
mean and 
measure. 
The profile corresponding to this variable type 
identifies the event record pattern described in the 
second part of the profile. In the implemented case, 
these records are login and logout events. Then the 
elapsed time between the two events is computed. The 
measured value is stored in the historical knowledge 
of the profile (list of values in the second parameter 
of the third part of the profile). Finally this 
measured period of time is analysed to verify its 
property inside a confidence interval computed on the 
base of the historical knowledge. 
Note that not only the elapsed time of period between 
login and logout may be calculated, it is easy to 
imagine other events to be checked in the same way 
( open and close of a file, set-up of a communication 
via the network, ... ) . 
c) The mean-of-records type 
deviation model with 
categorical) 
uses the mean and standard 
discrete measure (linear 
The profile corresponding to this variable type finds 
all file access events (in our example, only read 
access are taken into account) that match with the 
second part of the profile. Each time a record is 
encountered, a variable is incremented. At the end of 
the session, the total number of those event records 
is stored in the historical knowledge of the profile. 
As in the previous variable type, this number is 
checked with a confidence interval. 
In this case again, other event types may easily be 
checked. It is for examples the number of time a 
specific or a certain type of command is asked by the 
user, 
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5.1.3. The rules. 
The treatments applied to the profiles will be decomposed 
to be performed. That is why rules are now described to 
identify the different processings applied to profiles. 
First, the profiles are to be initialized each time it is 
required by the type of the profile {each day, each week, 
each time a specific event occurs, ... ) . 
The audit file is analysed sequentially. When a record is 
evaluated, all profiles matching this record are updated. 
Then these profiles are checked to see whether they are 
normal. If not, an action is to be executed. 
5.1.3.1. Initializing rules. 
Initializing rules initializes the profiles depending on 
the type of the variable. A profile may be initialized 
when a certain type of audit record is analysed, or when 
a period of time is elapsed {hour, day, week, ... }. 
The profiles of test-threshold type are initialized 
depending on the period of time the analysis is 
required. It is possible to evaluate event patterns 
in a period of one hour, or in one day. It is also 
possible to check the occurrence of the events 
during a user's session {identified by a login and 
a logout event). The initialization is to reset to 
0 the parameter value that will contain at the end 
of the period the number of occurrences of the 
analysed events. 
The mean-of-time-for-session profiles must be 
initialized every time a new session begins. The 
initialization consists of storing the timestamp of 
the login record into a variable. This variable 
will be consulted at the end of the checked period 
( the end of the session) to compute the elapsed 
time of the session. 
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The mean-of-records variable types are to be 
initialized at each new user's session. This may 
also be extended to a period of time. A variable is 
reset to O. This variable will contain at the end 
of the session the number of file accesses. 
5.1.3.2. Updating rules. 
Updating rules update the profiles. The value of a 
profile is updated depending on the type of the variable. 
The value may be updated depending whether an event 
occurs or whether a period of time is elapsed. 
The test-threshold profiles are updated each time 
an event record matches with the second part of the 
profile. A variable is incremented by one at each 
occurrence. 
The mean-of-time-for-session type profiles are only 
updated at the end of a session, when the logout 
time is known. The difference between logout and 
login time is computed and is inserted into the 
historical knowledge. 
With the profiles of mean-of-records type, each 
time a file access (read access) or any other 
described event occurs, a variable is incremented. 
At the end of the analysed period, the computed 
value is inserted into the historical knowledge of 
the profile. 
To update historical knowledge, the new measured value is 
added at the end of the list of value and the first 
element of the list is removed, acting as a sliding 
window as shown in figure 5 .1 This methods allows to 
remove old values that do not correspond anymore to 
current behaviours. 
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vl v2 v3 v4 v5 
: ~ 1 = ..... /_v_2 __ v_3 __ v_4 ___ v_s __ v_6___. 
Figure 5. 1 Upcta te of the historical knowl ectge as a 
sliding window. 
The first box of the figure 5.1 represents the knowledge 
before a new value is added. It is composed of 5 values 
vl to v5. The second box of the figure 5.1 shows that the 
value vl is removed out of the knowledge and the new 
value v6 is added at the end of the list. 
5.1.3.3. Checking rules. 
Checking rules test the profiles to determine whether the 
current behaviour is normal or not. The measured value is 
compared with the profile. 
The value of the test-threshold profile is checked 
each time a described event occurs. The profile 
value is compared with the threshold value. An 
action is taken if the value exceeds the threshold 
( upper threshold) . In some case, it is possible to 
imagine a lower limit or the combination of the two 
thresholds. 
With the mean-of-time-for-session type of profile, 
the measured value (session period of time) is 
compared with a confidence interval at the end of 
the session. The interval is parameterized by the 
threshold value of the profile that contains the 
parameter d7. If the measured value is outside this 
interval, an action is to be performed. 
The mean-of-records profiles are checked in the 
same manner as for the mean-of-time-for session. 
7 See section 4.1.3.1 of chapter 4. 
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In the case of the checking of historical knowledge, 
several methods may be imagined to be used, depending on 
the system environment and/or on the profile it-self. 
The first method is to update the historical knowledge 
before it is checked, even whether the measured value 
goes outside the confidence interval and does not 
correspond to the expected behaviour. The second 
possibility is to check the measured value, and only 
store it in the historic if it corresponds to the 
expected behaviour (if it falls inside the confidence 
interval). The first method would be used in environments 
where the user's behaviours may change suddenly. The 
modification is therefore notified and the profile is 
updated. The disadvantage is if the changed behaviour is 
due to a illegal user act on a legal identity, the 
profile of the legal user will be changed. The second 
method is the one used in the prototype. It only allows 
slow changes of behaviours. 
5.1.3.4. Acting rules. 
These rules are activated when an anomaly is detected by 
the checking rules. Their actions may be as described in 
section 4.3 
the printing of a message, 
the updating of a violation count, 
the activation of new rules (other profiles to 
check or in another manner, ... ) , 
modification of the selection criteria (pre-
selection, ... ) , 
etc, 
depending on the type of the detected anomaly. 
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5.2. Limitations of the prototype. 
As a prototype, it is not intended to fulfil all 
functionalities required. Some limitations are to be 
imposed for a first implementation : 
- All audit records are translated and analysed. 
There is no selection made by a translate_select 
component as described in section 4.1.1.3 of 
chapter 4. 
- Only two models operational model and mean and 
standard deviation model, are used to implement 
the three variable types ( see section .5. 1. 2. 2) . 
Other models like the markov process model, the 
multivariate model, the time series model may be 
implemented. 
- The detection of an anomaly involves a message to 
be displayed. No other action is performed as the 
update of a violation rate, the activation of new 
rules concerning the updating or the checking of 
the profiles, 
- The analysing prototype is only a learning normal 
system behaviour component and is not coupled 
with other components like a statistical one or a 
behaviour pattern recognition one. It is possible 
to imagine a resolver analysing the output of the 
different analysing components - sharing the same 
input file but processing it in isolation - and 
producing a single output based on the analysis 
of the other components. 
- No periodic anomaly rules are implemented. These 
rules are those fired when a period of time is 
elapsed. Only rules fired by the occurrence of 
events are implemented. 
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5.3. Experience learnHd and performance aspects. 
By the realization of this prototype and by the study of 
the PDAT8, an experience about the performance aspects can 
be learned. The prototype has been implemented in PROLOG 
language that is a fully interesting for its 
implementation speed capabilities in prototype 
realization. The PDAT is also a prototype initially 
realized in PROLOG and in which some modifications such 
as conversion of some PROLOG routines in C language, 
have been made to improve the quickness of the analysis. 
A speed ratio from 1 to 5 has been gained. 
The audit trail generation takes from about 1%9 to 5% of 
the total CPU time. Moreover about 5% of the CPU time are 
necessary again for the analysis of the generated audit 
trail depending strongly of the analysis methods used, 
the number of components, the number and content of the 
audit records (number of fields, micro or macro events, 
... ) , and some other parameters. 
These two complementary analysis components are not yet 
ready for ON-LINE analysis but works are seriously 
engaged in this way. 
8 See section 4.1.1.2 of chapter 4. 9 The SAT of BS2000 (SIEMENS) needs the following rate of CPU time 
- when SAT is not installed : 0,02% 
- when SAT is present but inactive : 0,03% 
- when SAT is active : 1,21% 
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AATs are quite young (about 10 years old) and it is easy 
to imagine great improvements in the next 10 years. 
6.1. Spreading and expansion of AATs. 
One expected evolution of AATs can be that they should be 
used not only for security purposes, where the tool 
analyses the security audit trails and searches for 
intrusions, but they should be general and configurable 
enough to evaluate audit trails (not only security audit 
trails) and to analyse other fields of IT with adequate 
criteria. These fields should be : 
- detection of bad functioning of some components 
in the system (devices, resources, ... ) ; 
- analysis of performance measures of critical 
components and resources of the system; 
In an other hand, some evolutions in IT are waited such 
as 
- the evolution of the AI techniques, 
- the increasing rapidity and storage capacity 
which computers work with, 
- the less computational costs of expert systems, 
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- the possibility for human people to explain their 
wishes and interact with more 
interfaces and languages (e.g., 
"natural" languages, ... ) , 
"user-friendly" 
no algorithm, 
- the new techniques developing learning machines 
as neural networks, 
These should allow security responsible people to have 
means for detecting more anomalies in a computer system 
and making very difficult to common users to perpetrate 
ill-disposed actions. 
The high computing speed and parallel computing may also 
be decisive in the development of AATs, making possible 
more simultaneity for analysis methods to evaluate the 
same audit data and thus reducing the risks of false 
alarms. Rapidity and few false alarms make more plausible 
automatic reactions by the tool itself in on-line 
systems. 
6. 2. Artificial intel 1 igence evolution and its impact on 
AAT. 
Artificial intelligence techniques are in full expansion 
and for example expert systems evaluating audit trails 
that have been introduced in chapter 4. Another new field 
of AI is neural networks. They are presented in the next 
section to show their utility in analysing security audit 
information. 
6.2.1. AATs using nnural networks. 
Neural networks are a relatively new field on the vast 
domain of the artificial intelligence. Artificial neural 
systems (other name for neural networks) can be used to 
detect computer abuses by analysing audit trail files. 
For the reader who already has heard something about 
neural networks but who is not accustomed with their 
utilizations and the terms used in relation with this 
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field, 
without 
the following section defines 
going into too much details, 
and 
what 
networks. The next section mentions some uses 
networks in analysing security audit trails. 
6. 2 .1.1. What are neural networks ? 
describes, 
are neural 
of neural 
Neural networks are one of the three forms taken by 
neurocomputing. The two other forms are : neurocomputing 
hardware (coprocessor boards), and neural chips. The term 
usually refers to software simulations of neurocomputing. 
"A neural 
processing 
network is a 
architecture 
massively parallel, information 
composed of many simple 
processing elements interconnected to achieve certain 
collective computational capabilities" [Illingworth 89]. 
Neural networks are characterized as a network because 
they are composed of interconnected processing elements 
( or neurons) as well as the neuronal structure of the 
brain. The numerous processing elements of a neural 
network are interconnected by informal channels. Each 
neuron may have many input signals while only one output 
signal may be generated. The output signal of an element 
is the input signal of one or more other elements as 
shown by figure 6 .1. Those input signals that are not 
output signals from another processing element are then 
input signals from the outside world. In that way the 
neurons are disposed in layers. The input layer receives 
data from the outside world. The middle or hidden layers 
are created by the neurocomputing software itself, and 
are where the "learning" takes place. "Learning is 
accomplished through trial and error, just as it might be 
with a human, using a feedback mechanism technique called 
back propagation" [Rochester 90]. This basic structure of 
neural networks makes them massively parallel computing 
devices. 
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Figure 6.1 Neural networks layers (from 
[Rochester 90 J). 
If the sum of the inputs to a given processing element 
exceeds a predetermined threshold, the processing element 
"fires" and sends a signal to the other connected 
processing elements. Notice that the interconnections 
between processing elements are not "simple" connections. 
In fact, each input has a weighted value that determines 
the strength of the interconnection to the fire or not-
fire decision of the following processing element. 
The unique outstanding feature of a neural network is its 
ability to auto- or self-adapt as a dynamic system that 
can modify its own responses. 
The many advantages of neural networks include 
Self-organization, 
No formal programming required, 
Ability to adapt and learn, 
Fault tolArance or graceful degradation1, 
II 
1 Graceful degradation : Information learned or stored in network memory (as in biological 
systemsl can be very tolerant to failures in hardware. Some neural networks have lost as much as 
20 percent of stored memory and still produced reasonable output results. [Illingworth 89] 
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Pattern Recognition, 
Intuition, prediction, and statistical pattern 
reconstruction." [Illingworth 89] 
The limitations of neural networks include: " 
Not good if precise answers are required, 
Cannot count (see forests, not trees), 
As yet cannot do things 
computers do effortlessly, 
Cannot justify answers, 
that conventional 
0ffline learning or training is difficult and 
sometimes very tedious." [Illingworth 89] 
6.2.1.2. Type of detected abuses. 
Several uses of neural networks may be considered in 
analysing security audit trails. The first possibility is 
to consider the neural network just as any other analysis 
component (as are learning behaviour and pattern 
recognition methods) . It is then coupled with the other 
existing components as shown in figure 6. 2. As already 
explained in section 4.2, a resolver can analyse the 
different outputs. 
in Neural Network out 
CoM11onent 
0 
u 
Resolver l p 
u 
E)(l)ert T in Syste"' out 
Audit Trails 
Figure 6.2 A neural network as a analysis component. 
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A second possibility can be the use of a neural network 
to learn and track the system-normal state, coupled with 
an expert system for in-depth intrusion analysis as 
figure 6. 3 shows. The neural network is used as a real-
time background monitor to adaptatively model the system 
and users normalcy. The purpose of the neural net is to 
learn the normal system activity and adapt to gradual 
changes. Rapid changes would trigger invocation of an 
expert system. A problem with expert system is that they 
are computationally expensive. With the architecture of 
the figure 6.3, the expert system can reside on the host 
computer and be invoked only when necessary. 
The neural network would provide an efficient and elegant 
front-end status monitor which is also general enough to 
recognize unknown viruses and possible malicious user 
behaviour patterns. 
This approach produces the following advantages : 
- adaptative modelling of the users and the system, 
ability to deal with unknown viruses or 
intrusions, 
- determination of when to use the 
computationally expensive expert system. 
more 
s p -+' 
Y a --+ 
s 1· 
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E! A-+ e At-+ 
e 
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s-+o/ 
Neural 
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"Sonething's 
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SysteA -11111111111-• Hypothesis, Action 
Figure 6.3 A neural network as a background monitor 
( from [ Fox 90 J ) • 
101 
Chapter 6 Future of Automatic Analysis Tools. 
Neural networks can be helpful in an intrusion-detection 
application by adaptively modeling the normal state for 
the users and the system, and take action when any 
abnormality is noted. For instance, the network would be 
trained by introducing samples of existing viruses to the 
system. Their patterns would be learned and associated 
with a human-prescribed antidote in each case. The next 
time the pattern appears in the system, the neural 
network monitor would trigger (or suggest) the defence. 
The advantage of a neural network is that if a new virus 
appears which the computer has not been vaccinated 
against, the network should still be able to recognize it 
as suspicious activity and notify the operator. At the 
same time, it would be able to learn the new pattern for 
future use. [Fox 90] 
6.2.2. Self-learning criteria. 
As presented in chapter 4, AATs can learn pat terns or 
behaviours to discover abnormal uses of a computer 
system. It is also possible to imagine that AATs should 
be able in the future to learn about research criteria. 
Self-learning criteria would provide a way for AATs to 
know what criteria are to be applied in such or such 
case. For instance, when an ill-disposed user is 
suspected or recognized to be a misfeasor (internal 
intruder2), it is not necessary to apply research criteria 
concerning external intruders. Knowing the elements on 
which criteria can be applied, the AAT would be able to 
combine or create the relevant questions needed to detect 
or confirm possible misuses. 
2 See chapter 1. 
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6.3. Evolution of the break-ins? 
It must be also taken into account that if all these 
evolutions are beneficial for intrusion-detections, they 
are also profitable for the criminality. The evolution of 
the technology is also a good weapon for misfeasors. The 
actual extent of computer crime is considered by most 
experts as the fastest growing illegal activities. And 
this, although misuses of computers are difficult to 
measure. 
The incidence of computer crime will increase because of 
the increasing number of computers and the automation of 
business activities. The size of losses in significant 
cases will increase because of the concentration of 
information assets in fragile forms subject to 
manipulation via computer. 
The principal reason for both the growth and lack of 
accurate measurement of computer crime is the difficulty 
in detecting a well-executed misuse. That is why AATs 
have future in IT. They contribute and help to avoid the 
danger that misuses are not detected. Moreover, when an 
attack is discovered, they contribute to search who?, 
what?, when?, how? making possible the find of ways to 
counter the violation. 
The always-growing and changing imagination of misusers 
makes pertinent the use of adaptable (learning) and even 
anticipating AATs to reduce the danger that crimes could 
be perpetrated without being known. 
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Security in information technology can be compared with 
home security. If the en trance of a house has no door, 
every body, friends as well as enemies, can easily enter. 
To mark physically the limits of the house, a door can 
close the home. But this is not sufficient, an intruder 
may easily enter by pushing the door open. Then a lock 
can be used to allow access to only people being in 
possession of the right key. But they still probably 
exist some people who are able to force the lock and so 
to break open the door. At this point there is a 
significant step the access is limited to few people. 
More secure locks can therefore prevent for any 
amateurish criminal. Alarm systems and locking of the 
windows would strengthen the home security, making more 
difficult and more expensive the penetration of the house 
(as well as for the inhabitants as disadvantage). 
With security, we can always go one step forward in the 
protection of an environment. But we have to cope with 
the imagination of the intruders who can always by-pass 
this "last" step. The advantage of this perseverance is 
the reduction of the number of misfeasors at each step 
due to the expansiveness of the intrusion. 
As for the entrance of a house, trusted system criteria 
evaluation books search and propose solutions of security 
measures to 1 imi t, and in some cases to avoid, computer 
system misuses to be perpetrated. These measures have to 
be evaluated and taken depending on the environment the 
system is dedicated. 
Security audit trail generations and analysis are only 
ONE of the numerous solutions that contribute to make 
systems safer and more secure for their users. Security 
audit trail, as any other method, is certainly not THE 
solution, and the above example illustrates well two 
important principles of security that are particularly 
true for audit trail. First, it confirms that a complete 
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security is not possible. What is feasible is to postpone 
the means used by criminals so that the access is more 
and more difficult until it is more expensive to break 
the environment than collecting the loot. But at this 
point, the game is not yet won: some "players" may still 
be interested only by the fact that an intrusion is 
accomplished than by what it could be profitable. 
The second principle is that, as shown by the more and 
more complicated means employed to make the door secure, 
some disadvantages appears for the individual who has to 
enter (into the house or into the computer system). More 
a system is secure more there exist inconveniences for 
"normal" or "legitimate" users. 
The major disadvantage of audit trail for the legitimate 
users is privacy. In U.S.A., keystroke dynamics are 
forbidden to protect typists against employers who would 
use this mechanisms to control the speed at which they 
work. The same problem is encountered with audit trail. 
An employer may analyse the logged information to know 
the performances of his employees. For instance it is 
possible with this type of data to know how much times a 
compiler is used by a user, or how many errors he has 
made, etc. 
As already said security audit trail generation and 
analysis is certainly not THE solution to security 
problems. Nevertheless, this type of security mechanism 
has a great advantage that is its flexibility to counter 
new attacks. While the imagination of intruders is 
endless to by-pass the security mechanisms, AATs allow 
the auditor to adapt his analysis criteria to counter the 
new attack immediately after this one is discovered. This 
method is comparable to cryptography where once a key is 
discovered, 
by changing 
means are 
criteria. 
the same mechanism can still be employed just 
the secret key. For audit trail, the same 
always valid just by adapting analysis 
By using technical safeguards like cryptography, advanced 
management controls, codes of conduct, audit trail, 
stimulated in part by strong criminal statutes, we can 
continue to limit the risks inherent in the use of 
computer technology to an acceptable level. 
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Appendix A: Advanced behavioural post-selection 
criteria. 
A.1. More elaborated behaviour patterns. 
Specific command sequences or behaviour patterns can be 
found interconnecting records together and possibly using 
variables to compare the fields content of the records. 
Examples of elaborated behaviour patterns could be : 
. One suspicious command immediately followed by a 
STATUS1 command will enforced the suspicion . 
. Detection of users logged on several physical 
terminals. Although it could be consider as 
normal for a user to be connected to several 
logical terminals. If this is not necessary an 
attempt of intrusion, it could be dangerous to 
leave more than one connected terminal without 
observation. Two variables are to be defined: one 
getting the value of the userid and another one 
getting the information about the terminal. The 
description of the behaviour is : find at least 2 
records where the userid fields have the same 
content and where the terminal fields are not 
equal. 
More than three 
(failed result) 
consecutive 
attempts for 
within five minutes is 
penetration attempt. 
unsuccessful login 
the same user-id 
considered as a 
1 In 8S2000, the STATUS command gives some informations about the current state of the system 
(logged users, current command, consumed CPU time, ... ) and allows to follow the execution of a 
command, program, ... 
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. The detection of sequences of repetitive actions 
can help in the detection of an anomaly (loop in 
a procedure, ... ) or an intrusion attempt 
( procedure that tries series of passwords on a 
userid or that tries one possible password on 
several userids, ... ) . 
Two or more login attempts within half an 
from geographically separated areas using 
same user-id is suspicious. 
hour 
the 
The detection of two attempts by the same user in 
such a short period of time that is doubtful that 
they could have been generated by a human at a 
conventional computer keyboard. This rule is 
designed to detect the type of attack in which a 
penetrator uses a computer to repeatedly generate 
userid / password pairs. 
Well-known intrusion scenarios can be considered 
as sequences of commands. For examples and 
practical scenarios, more knowledge and 
experience are needed. The best way is to talk 
with people involved with intrusions (people who 
test the security of the system, security 
administrators, ... ) 
A.2. Other behaviours. 
Behaviours can also be determined for files or programs, 
not only for users, to detect, for instance, viruses or 
unusual object uses. 
- the starting of a database is done every day at 
6.30 am. If it starts once at 9.00 pm, illegal 
accesses will certainly follow. 
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Appendix B : Post-selection criteria for advanced 
statistical analysis. 
Some profiles are now described for users, system, 
objects and subj ect-obj ec t relation. These profiles may 
be used to detect changes in the behaviours. These 
profiles have been selected for a BS2000 operating system 
but can easily be used to any other system. 
H.1. Profiles for users. 
time of login records the time in the day at 
which a user logs in, using the mean and standard 
deviation model. 
Each 24-hours period is divided into 3 
categories : day period, night period, and 
graveyard period. Each user's login is classified 
into one of these three categories. Since a 
user's login behaviour may vary considerably 
during a work week, login occurrences may be 
represented by an array of event counters 
parameterized by day of week and time of day. 
last login is an interval timer measuring time 
since last login, using the operational model. It 
would paticularly be useful for detecting a 
break-in on a "dead" account. 
- physical location : records the number of times a 
user is connected on the system from different 
locations (terminal, remote host, ... ), using the 
mean and standard deviation model. 
- connect time measures the length of a user 
session on the system. Each session is referred 
as a task and has a unique task number. Several 
sessions for the same user can be active at the 
same time. This profile uses the mean and 
standard deviation model. 
- CPU time records the amount of processing time 
consumed in a user session on the system, using 
the mean and standard deviation model. 
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- number of userids read : records how many userids 
(directories) have been read by the user, using 
the mean and standard deviation model. 
- number of userids modified 
other user ids (directories) 
records how many 
have been modified by 
a user. This profile uses the mean and standard 
deviation model. 
- number of files created/deleted/read or 
modified records how many files have been 
created, deleted, read, or modified by a user, 
using the mean and standard deviation model. 
- I/0 activity indicates the amount of input and 
output activity in a user session (disk access, 
... ), using the mean and standard deviation 
model. 
- protection violation number of file access 
protection violations in a user session, using 
the operational model. 
- different commands used records how many 
different commands were invoked by the user. This 
can indicate whether a user always uses the same 
commands or uses a large amount of various of 
them. This profile uses the mean and standard 
deviation model. 
- system errors records the number of system-
related errors invoked by the user, such as 
permission denied, disk usage overflow, ... , 
using the operational model. 
- system errors by type records the 
times each type of error occurred, 
operational model. 
number of 
using the 
- level of audit record activity indicates the 
amount of activity that occurred for the user. 
The value recorded is the number of audit records 
received for a particular user. This profile uses 
the mean and standard deviation model. 
- hourly audit record activity : 
of audit 
categorized 
records received 
by the hours of 
records the number 
for each hours, 
the day, using the 
mean and standard deviation model. 
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- day of use records how many audit records are 
produced by the user on a daily basis, using the 
mean and standard deviation model. 
- use of printers records the number of times a 
user prints out on a certain printer. If a user 
directs his printer output to some location other 
than where he normally sends output, he may be 
at tempting to leak sensitive data. This profile 
uses the mean and standard deviation model. 
- use of networking functions, 
B.2. Profiles for system. 
This type of profiles can determine whether a session has 
no anomaly in comparison with prior sessions. 
- number of users records the average number of 
users for a session, using the mean and standard 
deviation model. 
- login failures an inordinately large number of 
login failures system-wide might be indicative of 
an attempt to break the system. Records the 
number of bad login attempts made on the system, 
and encompasses both local and remote attempts 
into the system. This profile uses operational 
model. 
- system activity records the number of audit 
records received by the log mechanism. It is the 
accumulation of all audit records produced by all 
subjects on the system (note that it depends on 
the pre-selection criteria). This profile uses 
the mean and standard deviation model. 
- CPU usage records the amount of CPU time used 
on the system. It is the accumulation of CPU time 
used by all subjects on the system. This profile 
uses the mean and standard deviation model. 
- I/0 usage: records the amount of I/O used on the 
system. It is the accumulation of I/0 calls used 
by all subjects on the system, using the mean and 
standard deviation model. 
- hourly bad login attempts records the number of 
bad login attempts made on the system during each 
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hours. This measure is intended to track that 
times during the day that bad login attempts are 
usually common/uncommon. This profile uses the 
mean and standard deviation model. 
- system errors records the number of errors 
-
occurring on the system. It is the accumulation 
of all system errors invoked on the system. This 
profile uses the operational model. 
system errors by type records the number of 
errors of different types made on the system, 
categorized by error types, using the operational 
model. 
- hourly system errors records the number of 
errors that occurred on the system during each 
hours, categorized by the hours of the day. It is 
intended to track the times during the day that 
system errors are likely to occur. This profile 
uses the operational model. 
- network activity records 
records related to network 
the system, using the mean 
model. Other measures can 
network activities. 
the number of audit 
activity produced on 
and standard deviation 
be applied concerning 
- origin of connection: records for each origin of 
connection the number of times it logs in, using 
the mean and standard deviation model. This could 
determine unusual terminal, remote connection, 
B.3. Profiles for objects. 
a) programs : 
typical times of days used some programs 
may only be used in the morning (starting of 
a database, ... ) or during the night (batch 
programs and procedures) . This profile uses 
the mean and standard deviation model. 
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execution frequency 
times a program is 
of period, using 
deviation. 
: measures the number of 
executed during some time 
the mean and standard 
typical data volume and rate 
resource used by the program, 
and standard deviation model. 
or any other 
using the mean 
typical duration (CPU use) of the average 
time of a compilation or execution of a 
program can be stored. For instance, a normal 
interval of time for a compiler is between 0 
and 1 second for failures and between 5 and 
20 seconds in case of successful compiling. 
More could be a sign of presence of 
virus, This profile uses the mean and 
standard deviation model. 
execution denied 
attempts to execute a 
the operational model. 
measure 
certain 
the number of 
program, using 
program resource exhaustion count the 
number of times a program terminates in an 
abnormal manner during a day because of 
inadequate resources or because 'break' 
command invoked by a user. This profile uses 
the operational model. 
the files used for example, a C-compiler 
only read from *.c and *.lib files, and write 
to *. obj files. Other read or write accesses 
could be a sign of virus. This profile uses 
the mean and standard deviation model. 
seasonal or periodic use some program may 
only have a meaning if started after a period 
of time (program calculating the 
salaries), ... This profile uses the mean and 
standard deviation model. 
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b) files Some profiles used for programs may also 
be used for files or other objects. 
typical time of days used. 
access frequency. 
access denied. 
seasonal or periodic use, 
c) commands : 
frequency of a command in a session ratio 
of one command versus another, ratio of one 
command versus total activity, using the mean 
and standard deviation model. 
time between actions : last use of a command, 
last action of any type, using the mean and 
standard deviation model, 
B.4. Profiles for subject-object relations. 
It is not possible to determine a profile for each action 
that each user can perform on each object. Thus classes 
of subjects can be determined as well as classes of 
objects. In the above criteria, when a user or an object 
is referred, it could also be a group of users or 
objects. 
A possibility 1s to create profiles for subject-object 
only for privileged users or restricted objects in that 
way that if another user than the expected one access to 
a restricted object, his behaviour will probably be 
different and detected. 
- directories read/modify/create/delete frequency : 
indicates the frequency that a directory is 
read/modified/created/deleted by a class of 
users, using the mean and standard deviation 
model. 
- file usage records the number of times a user 
or a group of users use a file or class of files 
within the sys tern during a day ( or some other 
period), using the mean and standard deviation. 
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- read/write/create/delete frequency for a file or 
group of files, for a user or a group of users, 
using the mean and standard deviation model. 
- program usage indicates the number of times 
each program was used by the user, using the mean 
and standard deviation model. 
- it could be also interesting to know the average 
time of use for each of those programs, using the 
mean and standard deviation model. 
average use indicates the user's average time 
of use for a program, a database, ... , using the 
mean and standard deviation model. 
- read/write/delete/create fails 
that measure the number of access 
day, using the operational model. 
event counters 
violation per 
- execution frequency of programs using the mean 
and standard deviation model. 
- etc. 
This approach can be used for users, objects, systems 
that have homogeneous behaviours but can not be applied 
(or not easily) to non-homogeneous behaviours. A user 
that logs every day from 9.00 am to 17.00 pm, at the same 
location, has an homogeneous login behaviour. It is easy 
to detect an anomaly. But some users may log on several 
locations at any time of the day. It is therefore more 
difficult to describe such behaviours with profiles. 
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Appendix C Examples of implemented profiles. 
% The structure of a profile is 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
o, 
'O 
name of the variable, 
list of event type patterns, 
! the elements are connected 
logical OR 
result, 
user name pattern, 
list of information patterns, 
! the elements are connected 
logical AND 
type of the variable, 
threshold, 
value. 
with 
with 
% measures password failures for the entire system using 
% the operational model 
% 
profile(failed_password, 
[evt ( 'UCK')], 
% 
res( 'F'), 
userid ( ' *' ) , 
[], 
test_threshold, 
10, 
0). 
% measures the number of failed login for the userid TSOS 
% using the operational model 
% 
profile ( failed_logon __ and_password_for_TSOS, 
[ evt ( 'JDE' ) , evt ( 'JBE' ) , evt ( 'UCK' ) ] , 
res ( 'F' ) , 
user id ( 'TSOS ' ) , 
[], 
test threshold, 
8, 
0). 
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% 
% measures password failures for the userid TSOS using 
% the operational model 
% 
profile ( f ai led_password_f or _•rsos, 
[ evt ( 'UCK' ) ] , 
% 
res ( 'F'), 
user id ( 'TSOS ') , 
[], 
test threshold, 
3 / 
0). 
% measures the number of failed access to any file ... 
% using the operational model 
% 
profile ( access_denied_for __ file, 
[ evt ( 'FMD' ) , evt ( 'FRD' ) ] , 
res ( 'F'), 
% 
userid ( '* ' ) , 
[], 
test threshold, 
4 / 
0). 
% measures how many logons are generated for the entire 
% system 
% 
profile(how_rnany_logons, 
% 
[ evt ( 'JDE' ) , evt ( 'JBE' ) ] , 
res ( '*'), 
user id ( '* ' ) , 
[], 
test threshold, 
20, 
0). 
% measures the number of audit records generated by SAT 
% 
profile(how_many_audit_records, 
[ evt ( ' * ' ) ] , 
res ( '*'), 
userid ( '*' ) , 
[], 
test __ threshold, 
300000, 
0) • 
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% 
% measures the number of events generated for the userid 
% TSOS with a failed result. 
% 
profile(all_failed_events_for_TSOS, 
% 
[evt('*')J, 
res ( 'F'), 
userid ( 'TSOS ' ) , 
[], 
test threshold, 
30, 
0). 
% measures the length of a session for the userid TSOS 
% using the mean and standard deviation model. The 
% threshold value contains the parameter d. The value 
% contains the history concerning the user past 
% behaviour. 
% 
profile(length_of_session_for_TSOS, 
% 
[ evt ( 'JDE' ) , evt ( 'JED' ) ] , 
res ( ' S' ) , 
user id ( 'TSOS ' ) , 
[], 
mean_of_time_for_session, 
1.0, 
[001, 010, 018, 012, 003, 008, 015, 005, 052, 023]). 
% list of HHMM where HH is hours and MM minutes. 
% measures how many records are read by the userid RIM in 
% a session, using the mean and standard deviation model. 
% The threshold value contains the parameter d. The value 
% contains the history concerning the user past 
% behaviour. This profile is useful to detect attempts to 
% obtain sensitive data by inference and agregation 
% (e.g., by obtaining vast amounts of related data). 
% 
profile(record read, 
[ evt ( 'FRD' ) , evt ( 'LRE' ) , evt ( 'JED' ) ] , 
res ( 'S'), 
userid ( 'RIM ' ) , 
[], 
mean_of_read_records, 
1.0, 
[15, 10, 1, 16, 12, 23, 19, 30, 14, 10)). 
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% 
% measures how many records are read by the userid TSOS 
% in a session, using the mean and standard deviation 
% model. The threshold value contains the parameter d. 
% The value contains the history concerning the user past 
% behaviour. This profile is useful to detect attempts to 
% obtain sensitive data by inference and agregation 
% (e.g., by obtaining vast amounts of related data). 
% 
profile(record_read, 
[ evt ( 'FRD' ) , evt ( 'LRE' ) , evt ( 'JED' ) ] , 
res ( 'S'), 
userid ( 'TSOS ' ) , 
[], 
mean __ of __ read_records, 
1. 0, 
[15, 10, 7, 8, 12, 13, 19, 12, 14, 10)). 
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Audit Trail A set of records that collectively provide 
documentary evidence of processing used to aid in 
tracing from original transactions forward to 
related records and reports, and/or backwards from 
records and reports to their component source 
transactions. [NTCSEC 86) 
Channel An information transfer path within a system. May 
also refer to the mechanism by which the path is 
effected. [NTCSEC 86] 
Collection File A file collecting the security relevant 
events generated to make an audit trail. The 
security relevant events are selected based on pre-
selection filters. 
Covert Channel : A communication channel that allows a process 
to transfer information in a manner that violates 
the system's security policy. [NCSC 87 /1] 
Covert Storage Channel A covert channe 1 that involves the 
direct or indirect writing of a storage location by 
one process and the direct or indirect reading of 
the storage location by another process. Covert 
storage Channels typically involve a finite 
resource (e.g. , sectors on a disk) that is shared 
by two subjects at different security levels. 
[NCSC 87/1) 
Covert Timing Channel : A covert channel in which one process 
signals information to another by modulating its 
own use of system resources (e.g., CPU time) in 
such a way that this manipulation affects the real 
response time observed by the second process. 
[NCSC 87/1) 
Discretionary Access Control A means of restricting access 
to objects based on the identity of subjects and/or 
groups to which they belong. The controls are 
discretionary in the sense that a subject with a 
certain access permission is capable of passing 
that permission (perhaps indirectly) on to any 
other subject. 
Domain 
Event 
The set of objects that a subject has the ability to 
access. 
Operation of a subject to an object with a certain 
result. 
123 
Glossary 124 
Formal Security Policy Model : A mathematically precise 
statement of a security policy. To be adequately 
precise, such a mode 1 must represent the initial 
state of a sys tern, the way in which the sys tern 
progresses from one state to another, and a 
definition of a "secure" state of the system. To be 
acceptable as a basis for a TCB, the model must be 
supported by formal proof that if the initial state 
of the system satisfies the definition of a 
"secure" state and if all assumptions required by 
the model hold, then all future states of the 
system will be secure. 
Mandatory Access Control A means of restricting access to 
Multi 
objects based on the sensitivity (as represented 
by label) of the information contained in the 
objects and the formal authorization (i.e., 
clearance) of subjects to access information of 
such sensitivity. 
Level Device : A device that is used in 
permits it to simultaneously process 
more security levels without risk 
[NTCSEC 86] 
a manner that 
data of two or 
of compromise. 
NATO Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria: These 
criteria are the equivalent ones of the Department 
of Defence (DoD) approved by the NATO. 
Object A passive entity 
information. 
which contains or receives 
Pre-Selection : Selection, 
audi table events 
audit trail. 
Pdst-Selection : Selection, 
specified events 
audit trail. 
by authorized 
that are to 
personnel, 
be recorded 
of 
on 
by 
that 
authorized personnel, 
have been recorded on 
Reference Monitor Concept An access control concept 
mediates refers to an abstract machine that 
accesses to objects by subjects. 
the 
the 
of 
the 
that 
all 
Reduction File: File created by application of post-selection 
criteria on collection files to reduce the amount 
of events to be analysed. 
Security Level : The combination 
classification and a set 
categories that represents 
information. [NCSC 8 7 /1] 
of 
of 
the 
a hierarchical 
non-hierarchical 
sensitivity of 
Security Policy : A number of requirements and rules which 
specify how security relevant information is to be 
handled and processed. 
Glossary 
Security Relevant Event An event which can cause violation 
of the security policy. [NCSC 8 7 / 1] 
Security Target : A specification of the security required of 
a Target of Evaluation (TOE), used as a baseline 
for evaluation. The security target will specify 
functions of the TOE. It may also specify the 
security objectives, the threats to those 
objectives and the particular security mechanisms 
that will be employed. 
Sensitive Information Information that must be protected 
because its unauthorized disclosure, alteration, 
loss, or destruction will at least cause 
perceivable damage to someone or something. 
Sensitivity Label : A piece of information that represents the 
security level of an object and that describes the 
sensitivity (e.g., classification) of the data in 
the object. Sensitivity labels are used by the TCB 
as the basis for mandatory access control 
decisions. [NTCSEC 86] 
Single Level Device : A device that is used to process data of 
a single security level at any one time. 
[NTCSEC 86) 
Subject An active entity, generally in the form of a person, 
process or device that causes information to flow 
among objects or changes the system state. 
Subject Security Level A subject's security level is equal 
to the security level of the objects to which it 
has both read and write access. A subject's 
security level must always be less than or equal to 
the clearance of the user the subject is associated 
with. [NTCSEC 86] 
Target of Evaluation An IT system or product which is 
subject to security evaluation. 
Trusted Computing Base : The totality of protection mechanisms 
within a computer system including hardware, 
firmware, and software - which, in combination, 
enforce the security policy. 
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AAT 
DoD 
ES 
IDES 
IT 
MIDAS 
NCSC 
NTCSEC 
0B 
PDAT 
RACF 
SAT 
SMP 
Automatic Analysis Tool. 
Department of Defense. 
Expert System. 
Intrusion-Detection Expert System. 
Information Technology. 
Multics Intrusion Detection and Alerting System. 
National Computer Security Centre. 
NATO Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria. 
Orange Book [DoD 83). 
Protocol Data Analysis Tool. 
Resource Access Control Facility. 
Security Audit Trail. 
Security Module Package. 
TCB Trusted Computing Base. 
TIM Time-based Inductive Machine. 
TOE Target of Evaluation. 
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A 
AAT,51, 52, 74, 75, 78, 80, 96, 97, 102 
evolution, 96 
expansion, 96 
Act 
accidental act, 
deliberate act, 7 
Action,52, 64, 65, 78, 93 
automatic action, 79 
Activity : see also Behaviour 
historical activity, 68, 85 
normal activity,85 
past activity,77 
Administrator,31, 33, 35, 38 
After-the-fact investigation,28 
AIX, 35, 49 
Alarm,65, 78, see also Security alarm 
false alarm,74, 75, 79 
function,43, 47, 48 
Analysis,31, 43, 45 
approach,75 
behaviour analysis,54 
component,53, 58, 68, 100 
method,51 
method combination,74 
of behaviour pattern,53 
off-line analysis,52 
on-line analysis,52 
tool,25, 43, 49, 51, 69, see also 
Evaluator, Tool 
function,43, 46 
Anomaly,25 
known anomaly,42 
unknown anomaly,42 
Architecture,58, 64, 66, 101 
Artificial intelligence,74 
evolution,96, 97 
technique,58, 59, 67, 74, 97 
Assurance level,17 
Attack,53, 61 
kind of attack,6 
scenario, 54, see also Scenario 
Audit,15, 49 
data,28, 29, 34 
event,24, 30, 38 
file,26, 30 
record,21, 27, 33, 38, 42, 46, 54, 84, 
94 
subsystem,33 
trail,25, 26, 27, 33, 42, 49, 83 
analysis, 51, 100, see Analysis 
compaction,28 
evaluation : see analysis 
generation performance, 95 
generator,30 
mechanism, 27, 29, 33,43, see 
also Logging 
mechanism 
protection,28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 
3 7 I 3 9 
Auditing,8, 9, 21, 25 
Auditor,29, 31, 37, 39 
task,29, see also Security role 
Automatic analysis tool : see AAT 
Availability,4 
B 
Behaviour,51, 53, 83 
abnormal behaviour,53 
learning normal behaviour, 75, see 
Learning normal behaviour 
normal behaviour, 69, 71 
past behaviour,77 
pattern, 53, 54, 57, 64, 72, 76, 101 
pattern analysis,59 
recognition, 51, 52, 58, 75 
simple behaviour,43 
suspicious behaviour, 53 
Breach,5 
internal breach,8 
Break-in 
evolution,103 
security break-in,5 
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C 
Collection file. 26, 31. 59, 8} 
Confidentiality,3 
Configurability,80 
Control mechanism,5 
Counter~easure.9, 21 
Covert channel,13 
Covert storage channels,23 
Covert timing channels,2J 
Criteria, 12, 26 
behaviour criteria, 54, 55, 58 
elaborated criteria, 53, 54, 58 
evaluation criteria,9, 14, 15, 16, 19, 
2 2, 2 3 
pre-selection : see Post-selection 
post-selection : see Pre-selection 
selection criteria,57 
self-learning criteria,102 
simple criteria,43, 53, 54, 55, 59. 
see also Filter 
trusted system criteria, 9 
D 
Data volume,29, 30, 32, 34, 36, 33 
Department of Defence,9 
Detection,5, 21. 52, 54 
deviation detection,73 
Deterrence,5, 25, 52, 74 
E 
Evaluation,42, 43, 45, 51, 52 
class,10, 12, 16 
level,18 
Evaluator,30, 45, see also Tool, Analysis 
tool 
Event,21, 22, 24, 72 
administrative event, 35 
auditable event, 22, 23, 32 
base event,35 
interconnection,51 
macro-event,27 
micro-event,27 
record,84, see also Audit record 
security event,30 
security-relevant event,21. 22. 25, 
3 0 I j 3 
sequence,53, 57, 59 
single event,53 
table,35 
type,34, 55 
Expert system,53, 59, 60, 62, 64, 66, 76, 77, 
101 
component,60, 66, 77 
Explanation facility,61 
External intrusion,8 
Fabrication,6, 7 
Fact base, 59, 64 
F-G-H 
Filter ,42, 46, 49, 54, 56, see also simple 
Criteria 
Functionality class,18 
I 
IDES,69, 75, 76, 80 
Implementation,58 
Inference mechanism,60 
Infiltrator,8 
Information Technology,3 
evolution,96 
security evaluation criteria, 
Integrity,3 
Interception,6 
Interceptor,6 
Interruption,6 
Intrusion,53 
internal intrusion,8 
scenario, 51, see Scenario 
Intrusion-Detection Expert System 
Intrusion-detection system, 52, 75, 
J-K-L 
Justification,61, 78 
Keystroke dynamics,74 
Knowledge,61, 85 
acquisition facility, 61 
base,58, 59, 60, 61, 65, 74 
historical knowledge, 91, 93 
statistical knowledge, 68, 76 
16, 18 
see IDES 
77 
Learning normal behaviour, 68, 83, 94 
Logging mechanism, 27, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 
37, see also Audit trail 
mechanism 
Malicious 
destruction, 6 
people, 5 
Masquerader,8 
M 
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Measure,5, 87 
binary categorical measure,69 
countinuous measure,69 
discrete measure,69 
intrusion-detection measure,68, 68, 76 
linear categorical measure,69 
statistical measure,67 
Message,78 
MIDAS, 75, 77, 80 
Misfeasor,8 
Misuse,5, 78 
Model.70, 94 
markov process model, 71 
mean and standard deviation model, 70, 
94 
operational model, 70, 94 
time series model,71 
Modification,6, 7, 28 
Monitor ,21, 37 
Monitoring, 8 
Multics Intrusion Detection and Alerting 
System : see Midas 
N-O-P 
Neural network,51, 97, 101, 102 
structure,98 
use.100 
Object,22 
Operational security,4 
Pattern,72, see also Behaviour pattern 
PDAT,55, 75, 80, 95 
Penetration,13 
Perpetrator,25 
Post-selection.30, 31, 43, 45, 46, 49, 65, 
see also Criteria 
Pre-selection,26, 30, 31, 34, 65, see also 
Criteria 
Prefilter,36, see pre-selection 
Prevention,5, 21 
Procedural security,4 
Profile,68, 70, 71, 76, 77, 83, 85, 88, 90, 
92 
learning profile,51 
Protection,28 
system,14 
mechanism,5 
Protocol Data Analysis Tool see POAT 
Prototype,72, 74, 83, 85, 94 
input,83 
limitation,94 
profile,85 
rule,90 
R 
RACF, 47 
Record : see Audit record 
sequence,54 
single audit 
record,54 
Recovery,5 
Reduction 
file,26. 30, 46 
tool,28, 42, 43, 49, 51 
utility,49, 50, see dlso Tool 
Reference monitor concept,13 
Report 
generator,43 
result report,30 
writer ,43, 47 
Requirement,10, 15 
Resolver, 7 5, 100 
Resource Access Control Facility see RACF 
Rule,90 
acting rule,93 
base,64 
checking rule,92 
initializing rule,90 
ruled-base system,62 
updating rule,91 
Safeguard,4 
SAT,45 
s 
Scenario,53, see also Attack 
elaborated scenario,63 
of intrusion,61 
Security,9 
administration,33 
alarm, 39, 47, 49, see also Alarm 
analysis,31 
audit history,72 
audit trail,10, 21 
auditing,9, 21 
console,48, 78 
evaluation criteria,16 
event,21 
formal security policy model,13 
functionality,18 
internal security,5 
level,13 
measure,4 
officer,25, 31, 38, 42, 52, 53, 55 
physical security,4 
policy,11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 53 
privileged people,28 
protection,9 
relevant information, 30, 51 
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responsible,47, see also Security 
officer, Administrator 
role,29, 30, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39 
Security Module Package, see SMP 
violation,5, 8, 28, see Attack 
Selection,43, 54 
Self-training facility,61 
SMP,49 
Standard deviation,77 
Statistical 
analysis,83 
analysis method,51, 63 
data,51 
information,47 
knowledge,68, 76 
method,66, 75, 76 
model,88 
profile,75, see also Profile 
Subject,22 
Supervising mechanism,8 
Suspicion rating,78 
System call,27, 35 
Table 
T 
event table, 35 
dynamic table,63 
static table,63 
Target of Evaluation,18 
TCB,12, 13, 14, 27, 28, 39 
Threat,), 4, 7 
monitoring,9 
Trt<,72, 30 
Time-based inductive learning,72 
Time-based Inductive Machine, see TIM 
Tool,25, JO, 31, 43, 51, 59, see also 
Trusted 
Analysis tool, Evaluator 
application process,27, 34 
computer system,11, 21 
Computing Base,12 
process,35 
u-v-w 
Unauthorized 
access,3 
deletion,28 
modification,J 
weakening,4 
Uncertainty,61 
Unexpected access,5 
User 
clandestine user,8 
class,36 
illegal user, 8 
interface,60 
profile,51, see also Profile 
Variable,54, 56, 57, 58 
VAX/VtiM,37, 49 
Violation rate, 23, 70, 79 
1ulnerability,8, 53 
Warning, 79 
Warning count,70, 78 
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